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SUMMARY: Petr contends that (1) he had a constitutional right as 
an indigent defendant to be provided with the opportunity to establish 
by expert psychiatric evidence his insanity defense; (2) denial of his ---request for expert psychiatric assistance violated his right to 
individualized sentencing; and (3) the prejudice resulting from his 
appearance throughout his trial while forcibly drugged with the '? 
~
sedative Thorazine is constitutionally offensive. 
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-FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: On Oct. 15, 1979, petr, acfe~mpanied by 
an accomplice, forcibly entered the home of Rev. Douglass. 
Reverend, his wife and their two teenage Petr 
and his accomplice ransacked the Douglass' home as they hel 
family at gunpoint. They bound and gagged the Reverend, 
the son. The two men then took turns attempting to rape 
year-old daughter. When they failed in 
twelve-
bound and 
forced her to lie on the floor with the rest of her family. Petr then 
shot each of the family members. Two died and two survi a. 
Petr was tried and convicted of two counts of murder and two 
counts of shooting with intent to kill. He was sentenced to death for 
each of the murder charges. At petr's arraignment in Oklahoma, the 
presiding judge sua sponte ordered a psychiatric evaluation of petr's 
mental state and competency to stand trial. Petr was sent for 
approximately two months of observation to a state mental institution. 
Pursuant to Oklahoma statute, the staff of the mental health facility 
examined petr's mental state only with respect to his then present 
sanity and competence to stand trial. 
The TC held a special hearing to determine petr's competency to - -------------- ""'--
stand trial. At the hearing, which was six months after the offense, 
~ __________, I / '\ "\ 
two psychiatrists testified to petr's lack of sanity. Neither 
' 
psychiatrist was asked his opinion as to whether petr was sane at the 
time of the offense. After the hearing, the TC found petr to be ------------mentally ill and ordered petr recommitted to the state mental 
hospital. Pursuant to Oklahoma statute, the criminal proceedings 
against petr were tem12._orarily suspended. r--
After seven weeks at the hospital, the facility's forensic 
psychiatrist wrote a letter to the court expressing his opinion 
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maintained on the sedative Thorazine. Without further inquiry, the --------court reinstated the criminal charges against petr. 
The court appointed counsel to represent petr because of his 
indigency. At a pretrial conference, petr's counsel informed the 
court that petr would plead not guilty by reason of insanity and that 
counsel needed the assistance of a psychiatrist to examine petr with 
respect to his mental condition at the time of the offense in order to 
prepare an adequate insanity defense. Counsel argued that the 
psychiatric testimony at the competency hearing raised a substantial 
question of petr's sanity at the time of the offense and that in view 
of petr's indigency, petr had a constitutional right to the assistance 
of a court-appointed psychiatrist or the funds necessary to hire a 
private psychiatrist. 
The TC denied petr's request, noting that provision of a 
psychiatric expert was not authorized by statute and that Oklahoma 
practice was to deny indigent defendants such assistance or funds. At 
trial, the defense called the psychiatrists the state had relied on to 
establish petr's incompetency and subsequent competency to stand 
trial. Ea~ es~~~ied that petr was mentally ill, but none was abl~ ~ 
to give an opinion about petr's sanity at the time of the offense I 
because they had not examined him for that purpose. 
Pursuant to instructions of the psychiatrist from the mental 
health facility, petr was sedated with Thorazine throughout his trial. 
Petr remained mute throughout the trial, refused to converse with his 
attorneys and stared straight ahead during both stages of the 
proceedings. Petr's counsel objected to the heavy sedation because it 
rendered petr "zombie"-like, prejudicing him before the jury and 
rendering him incapable of assisting his attorneys • 
' . l ... 
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-After the jury returned a verdict of guilty, during the 
sentencing stage, the State relied on the testimony of psychiatrists 
to establish an aggravating circumstance, i.e., that petr would 
predictably commit future acts of violence. Petr had no psychiatric 
witness to rebut the State's psychiatric testimony, and no psychiatric 
assistance necessary to prepare and establish mitigating evidence, 
such as petr's mental state at the time of the offense or the 
psychological effects of the child abuse he suffered. Petr was 
sentenced to death. 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment and 
sentence. The court rejected petr's contention that the State has the 
responsibility of providing psychiatric services to indigents charged 
ith capital crimes. Alternatively, the cour!._ ( ound that the argument 
Ml~was not preserved in the motion for new trial and was thereb;-wai~ d. Jf 
- ------- ---As to n~ffect of Thorazine, the court noted expert testimony that 
\__./ without the benefit of the medication, petr could revert to a violent 
state, but that with it, petr was competent to stand trial and assist 
his attorneys. The court found "no reason to believe the [petr's] 
behavior was caused by any factor other than his own volition." 
CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that he had a constitutional right to 
expert psychiatric assistance and that indigency alone prevented him 
from introducing evidence to negate criminal responsibility. This 
right derives from the equal protection and due process clauses as 
well as the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 
1154, 1163 (CAS 1974) (reversing conviction where indigent defendant 
was not provided with a psychiatrist's assistance in preparing and 
proving his defense). Petr also claims that denial of expert 
psychiatric assistance violated his right to individualized sentencing 




violence which the prosecution established by the use of psychiatric 
testimony • 
Petr also argues that the prejudice to him resulting from his 
appearance throughout the trial while forcibly drugged with the 
sedative Thorazine is constitutionally offensive. The demeanor in 
court of one who has raised the issue of his sanity is itself of 
probative value to the fact finder. 
The State responds that petr was not entitled to psychiatric 
assistance because petr was allowed to call as witnesses the two 
psychiatrists and a physician who had examined petr in order to 
determine his ability to stand trial. The State also argues that 
there is nothing in the record to support petr's contention that he 
was insane at the time of offense, and there are indications that petr 
was in fact sane. For example, petr gave a detailed confession which 
he signed. Furthermore, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in the 
7 
present case held that this argument was waived. As to the effect of -
Thorazine, resp states that petr's attorneys withdrew their motion for 
trial on present sanity and raised the issue only only in closing 
argument. The argument was therefore waived. 
DISCUSSION: This Court has previously granted cert on the 
question whether the constitution requires the State to provide a 
defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity with the 
assistance of a psychiatrist.~ ~ush v. Texas, 372 U.S. 586 (1963) (per 
curiam). The Court never addressed the question, however. Although 
the issue is therefore obviously certworthy, the court below held that 
petr had waived the claim. Since this appears to be an adequate and 
independent state ground for the Oklahoma court's decision, I do not 





Petr's principal argument with respect to the Thorazine is that 
his appearance before the jury while drugged denied him a fair chance 
for the jury favorably to assess his demeanor and character. The 
Oklahoma court did not address the question, and it is unclear that it 
was raised below. As to the Thorazine argument petr did raise, the 
Oklahoma court relied on the testimony of experts in concluding that 
--, ye drug did not prevent petr from assisting his lawyers. Petr's 
\J argument~ con~;;_,:;s~ a-;:-;:;-f~:al~ I therefore 
recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
GLEN BURTON AKE, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA 
No. 83--5424. Decided February-, 1984 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
This case poses an important federal constitutional issue: 
whether, under an · nces a defendant has a con-
stitutional e assistance of a psychiatrist in t e 
preparation of his defense. Affirmmg 
viction and death sentence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals held that the federal constitution imposes no such 
obligation. This holding appears to violate the petitioner's 
right to effective assistance of counsel, a Sixth Amendment 
protection applicable to the States through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). The holding also appears to vi-
olate the petitioner's rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has pre-
viously indicated a willingness to consider this issue which 
continues to generate conflict between various state and fed-
eral courts. That this is a capital case adds special urgency 
to the need to review the issue posed by the petitioner. I 
would therefore vote to grant and respectfully dissent from 
the Court's denial of certiorari. 
I 
In the winter of 1979, in Canadian County, Oklahoma, the 
petitioner, Glen Burton Ake, Jr., was charged with murder-
ing a couple and wounding the couple's two children. Ake v. 
State, 663 P. 2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). At his arraign-
ment the petitioner was ejected for disruptive behavior. 
Subsequently, the judge who presided at the arraignment or-
dered, sua sponte, that Ake be given a psychiatric evaluation 
~ cv'u ~ ~,9 f ~4 wJuJJJiu ~ hsvu 
L ~ Vr,.,f;:,_ DJ Ur,.__-fa- ~ec./µ_d ~ ~ ~~d 
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to determine his competency to stand trial. Ake spent ap-
proximately two months at a mental hospital where he was 
evaluated only with respect to his competency to stand trial; 
no evaluation was made concerning his state of mind at the 
time of the crime. On April 10, 1980, after a hearing in 
which several psychiatrists testified to petitioner's lack of 
present sanity, the trial court found Ake to be mentally ill 
and committed him to the state mental hospital. On May 27, 
1980, the trial court reinstated criminal charges against Ake. 
Although the trial judge gave no reason for his decision, it 
appears to have been influenced by a letter written by the 
mental hospital's chief forensic psychiatrist. The letter 
stated that in the opinion of the hospital staff Ake had im-
proved to the point where he would be capable of understand-
ing the charges against him and of aiding his attorney with 
his defense. See ~pp. to Pet. for Cert. A-20. 
Because Ake is indigent and could not afford counsel, the 
court appointed an attorney to represent him. At a pretrial 
conference, the attorney informed the court of the petition-
er's intention to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. The 
attorney then requested that the court either appoint a psy-
chiatrist to examine the petitioner or provide the petitioner 
with the funds necessary to obtain an examination. Accord-
ing to the petitioner's attorney, an expert psychiatric evalua-
tion was needed in order to assert a competent defense. 1 
The trial judge denied this request on the grounds that the 
federal Constitution did not compel the expenditure of funds 
1 Pleading with the trial court for assistance in obtaining the services of a 
psychiatrist, Ake's attorney stated that "[t]o deny to this client .. . funds 
for the preparations would be a miscarriage of justice . . . because an attor-
ney has got to have . . . funds to properly defend his client. . . . I cannot 
possibly believe [that] a few meager dollars is going to stand between a 
man charged with Murder in the First Degree [and] a constitutional, fair 
and impartial trial. . . . Life, itself is far too precious to consider any 
monetary value that might be expended within reason. " See App. to Pet. 
for Cert. at A-30. 
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for an examination and that the court was without statutory 
authority to expend state funds for such a purpose. 2 
The petitioner was tried in one day. He attempted to es-
tablish his insanity defense by calling as witnesses the two 
psychiatrists and the physician who had initially found him to 
be incompetent to stand trial but subsequently found him to 
be competent. None of these witnesses was able to offer an 
opinion about petitioner's sanity at the time of the offense be-
cause they had only examined him for the limited purpose of 
determining his competency to stand trial. The petitioner 
thus received no psychiatric examination relating to his san-
ity at the time of the offense. At the sentencing phase of the 
trial, the State relied on expert psychiatric testimony to es-
tablish the petitioner's "future dangerousness," one of the ag-
gravating circumstances upon which the jury hinged its death 
sentence. 3 Lacking access to a psychiatrist, the petitioner 
2 The trial judge denied the petitioner's request in an oral ruling in 
which he observed that he was "aware of" United States. ex rel. Smith v. 
Baldi 344 U. S. 561 (1953), "in which the U. S. Supreme Court held that a 
State does not have a constitutional duty to provide private psychiatric 
examination to indigent defendants." App to Pet. for Cert. at A-31. The 
trial judge commented further that state law mandates that "courts may 
not-repeat, 'not'-spend any court funds unless specifically authorized by 
statute. This has been more and more strictly construed against courts, 
and so unless I can see some specific authority, I could not even consider 
[granting the defendant's request.] The request for private psychiatric 
evaluation at the expense of the State is denied. You may have the de-
fendant available, if you are able to arrange it, in some other manner." 
Ibid. 
3 Under Oklahoma law, the jury must find at least one statutorily de-
fined aggravating circumstance in order for the death penalty to be im-
posed. See Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.11. In this case, the jury found 
three aggravating circumstances: that the petitioner was likely to commit 
future acts of violence, that the crime was committed to avoid arrest, and 
that the crime was especially cruel, heinous and atrocious. Ake v. State, 
supra, at 11. 
In Zant v. Stephens, -- V. S. -- (1983), this Court upheld the impo-
sition of a death penalty in a case where the jury made multiple findings of 
aggravating circumstances, one of which was invalidated on appeal. The 
Court held that given the particular structure of the death penalty statute 
4 AKE v. OKLAHOMA 
offered no expert testimony to rebut the opinion of the 
State's expert. 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the con-
viction and the death sentence. Ake v. State, supra. In re-
sponse to the petitioner's claim that the district court had 
erred in not providing him with any expert psychiatric assist-
ance, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that notwithstand-
ing the unique nature of a capital case, "the State does not 
have the responsibility of providing such services to indigents 
charged with capital crimes." Id., at 6. 
II 
In defending the holding of the Court of Appeals, the State 
forgoes any justification of the Court of Appeals' constitu-
tional holding. Instead, the State maintains that the con-
stitutional question need not be reached because, in this case, 
the petitioner failed to put into serious question the issue of 
his sanity at the time of the offense. According to the State, 
petitioner's sanity was never in serious question because he 
had had no prior history of mental illness, reportedly ex-
pressed fear once he learned that the children of the mur-
at issue, the invalidation of one finding of aggravating circumstances did 
not require the invalidation of the sentence as a whole so long as at least 
one valid finding was available to support the imposition of capital punish-
ment. Under the death penalty statute at issue in Zant, the jury was not 
instructed "to balance aggravating against mitigating circumstances pursu-
ant to any special standard." Id., at --. Indeed that statute did not 
require the jury to undertake any balancing of mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances. Id., at--. Oklahoma's death penalty statute, by con-
trast, does require such balancing. It states that "[u]nless at least one of 
the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act is so found 
or if it is found that any such aggravating circumstance is outweighed by 
the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty 
shall not be imposed." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.11. The reasoning of 
Zant, then, does not appear to control this case; if one aggravating circum-
stance is invalidated on appeal, the death sentence itself must be vacated 
even in the presence of other, unchallenged findings of aggravating circum-
stances. See Zant v. Stephens , supra, at -- (JUSTICE MARSHALL 
dissenting). 
AKE v. OKLAHOMA 5 
dered parents had survived their wounds, and gave a de-
tailed and lucid post-arrest confession. Brief in Opp. ~-
The central problem with this analysis is that it wholly ig-
nores the reason the trial court offered as to why it refused to 
appoint a psychiatrist to aid the petitioner with his insanity 
defense. There is no indication whatsoever that the trial 
court's ruling was predicated upon a finding that petitioner 
had failed to present a colorable showing of insanity at the 
time of the offense. 4 Rather, the trial court rejected peti-
tioner's request for a court-appointed psychiatrist on the 
grounds that it lacked statutory authorization to make such 
an appointment and that the federal Constitution did not 
compel it to satisfy the petitioner's request. The Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court on these 
same grounds. 5 See Ake v. State, 663 P. 2d, at 6. Thus, con-
'Neither the trial court nor the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
made any inquiry into whether the petitioner could make a colorable show-
ing that he was insane at the time of the offense. They apparently as-
sumed that the petitioner would have no constitutional right to psychiatric 
assistance no matter what sort of showing he was capable of making. 
That the petitioner succeeded in raising insanity to the status of a color-
able issue is indicated by the fact that the jury received an insanity instruc-
tion. See Ake v. State, supa, at 10. 
Rejecting the claim that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the 
evidence that the petitioner was not guilty by reason of insanity, the Okla-
homa Court of Appeals held that the petitioner "failed to establish any rea-
sonable doubt as to his sanity at the time the crimes were committed." Id. 
Whether the petitioner established reasonable doubt as to his sanity is a far 
different issue, however, than whether the petitioner made enough of a 
showing to put his sanity into question. While the former relates to the 
final resolution of a claim of insanity, the latter entails a preliminary deci-
sion relating to whether a defendant has made an initial showing substan-
tial enough to warrant the appointment of a psychiatrist. 
5 The Oklahoma Court of Appeals also held that the petitioner's claim 
had not been properly preserved in the motion for a new trial and that it 
had thus been waived. Ibid. Assuming that the petitioner failed to sat-
isfy Oklahoma's procedural requirements for preserving claims on appeal, 
this Court can still properly exercise jurisdiction over this case because the 
Oklahoma Courtof Appeals' ruled on the merits of petitioner's constitu-
6 AKE v. OKLAHOMA 
trary to the State's suggestion, this Court must indeed reach 
the federal constitutional issue in order properly to adjudi-
cate this case. 
The issue presented by this case is whether, under any cir-
cumstances, a defendant has a federal constitutional right to 
the services of a psychiatrist for the purpose of preparing a 
defense to a criminal prosecution in a state court. The Court 
granted certiorari to consider this question in Bush v. Texas, 
372 U. S. 586 (1963). In Bush an indigent defendant who 
had previously been adjudicated insane was charged and con-
victed of theft. At trial, the defendant pleaded not guilty by 
reason of insanity and requested that the court either send 
him to a state medical institution for observation and diagno-
sis or appoint and pay for a psychiatrist for this purpose. 
The trial judge rejected this request, noting that the court 
"had no fund or money for so-called psychiatrists, alienists, 
quacks or specialists." Brief for Petitioner in Bush v. 
Texas, 0. T. 1962, No. 511, p. 3. This Court declined to re-
solve this issue only because the Assistant Attorney General 
of Texas indicated at oral argument that he would seek to 
have the defendant retried based upon a post-conviction psy-
chiatric evaluation of the defendant which showed that the 
defendant was then mentally ill and that he may have been 
mentally ill at the time of the crime. Bush v. Texas, supra, 
at 590. 6 
tional claim. A ruling on the merits of a federal question by the highest 
state court leaves the federal question open to review by this Court. See, 
e.g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 161-162 (1978) 
6 The trial court evidently believed that United States ex rel. Smith v. 
Baldi, 344 U. S. 561 (1953) decided the issue posed by petitioner for it cited 
Baldi for the proposition that "a State does not have a constitutional duty 
to provide psychiatric examinations to indigent defendants." App. to Pet. 
for Cert. at A-31. Baldi stands for no such proposition. Smith claimed 
that his conviction and death sentence was invalid because the State had 
deprived him of the assistance of a psychiatrist. The Court rejected the 
petitioner's assertion not on the grounds that the federal Constitution did 
not compel the provision of a psychiatrist but rather on the grounds that, in 
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Equally as significant as the Court's previous willingness 
to consider the issue posed by this case, is the history of Bush 
subsequent to this Court's remand. In state court, the de-
fendant was found to be sane. A federal district court, how-
ever, granted habeas corpus relief to the defendant on the 
grounds that the state court had failed to provide the peti-
tioner with an adequate process by which to establish his in-
sanity claim. Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (ND 
Tex. 1964), aff'd, 334 F. 2d 672 (CA5 1965). More specifi-
cally, the federal district court ruled that the state court had 
violated the defendant's right to effective assistance of coun-
sel by refusing, prior to trial, either to commit the defendant 
fact, the petitioner had had the benefit of a psychiatric evaluation as to his 
sanity at the time of the crime and that that evaluation sufficed to satisfy 
the requirements of due process. 344 U. S., at 568. 
One sentence in Baldi, if quoted out of context, seems to support the in-
terpretation of the holding urged by respondent. In that sentence, the 
Court remarked that a State does not have the duty by federal constitu-
tional mandate to appoint a psychiatrist to make a pretrial examination. 
Ibid. What the Court clearly meant was that a State was under no con-
stitutional compulsion to provide a defendant with psychiatric assistance 
once a court-appointed psychiatrist had examined the defendant as to his 
sanity at the time of the crime and presented to the jury his expert opinion 
on the issue. Because the defendant had had the benefit of at least some 
expert testimony regarding his alleged insanity at the time of the offense, 
the Court found that the requirements of due process were satisfied. In 
the words of the Court, "the issue of petitioner's sanity was heard by the 
trial court. Psychiatrists testified. That suffices." Id. Here, by con-
trast, no psychiatrist testified as to the petitioner's sanity at the time of 
the offense. 
Apart from being readily distinguishable on the facts, Baldi offers little 
precedential value with respect to the legal issues at stake here because it 
predates this Court's enlargement of the affirmative duty of the states to 
provide to indigent defendants the legal tools necesary for a fair trial. 
Among the landmark decisions that postdate Baldi and erode the proposi-
tion for which the the trial court cited it are Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 
(1956) (constitutional right to transcript for appeal as ofright from criminal 
conviction), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963) (constitutional 
right to counsel in felony trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963) 
(constitutional right to counsel for direct appeal). 
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to a state facility for examination or to appoint a psychiatrist 
to examine him. The federal district court justified its rul-
ing by observing that "the right to counsel is meaningless if 
the lawyer is unable to make an effective defense because he 
has no funds to provide the specialized testimony which the 
case requires." Id., at 565. 7 Other courts have indicated 
support for the analysis suggested by Bush, especially in the 
context of a capital case. See, e. g., Blake v. Zant, 513 F. 
Supp. 772, 787 (SD Ga. 1981) (habeas corpus relief granted 
because "in a capital case, a defendant whose sanity at the 
time of the alleged crime is fairly in question , has at a mini-
mum the constitutional right to at least one psychiatric 
examination at state expense.") (emphasis in original). 8 
7 The Sixth Amendment guarantees, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions , the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the 
Assistance of counsel." The Court has long recognized, however, that 
this right is vitiated when the circumstances surrounding the appointment 
of counsel deny a defendant "effective and substantial aid." Alabama v. 
Powell, 287 U. S. 45, 53 (1932). See also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 
U. S. 475, 489-490 (1978); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, 446 (1940). 
Similarly, this Court has prohibited government conduct that would render 
ineffective an attorney's assistance to a defendant. See, e.g., Moore v. 
Illinois, 434 U. S. 220 (1977); Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976); 
United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967). 
8 See also Hintz v. Beto, 379 F. 2d 937, 941-943 (CA5 1967); Jacobs v. 
United States, 350 F. 2d 571, 573 (CA41965); United States ex rel. Robin-
son v. Pate, 345 F. 2d 691, 691>-696 (CA71965), aff'd in part and remanded 
in part on other grounds 383 U. S. 375. But see Watson v. Patterson, 358 
F. 2d 297 (CAlO), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 876 (1966); United States ex rel. 
Huguley v. Martin, 325 F. Supp. 489, 492-493(ND Ga. 1971); Houghtaling 
v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 309, 163 S. E. 2d 560, 562 (1968) cert. denied 
394 U. S. 1021 (1969). A useful listing of relevant cases is contained in 
Weeks, Right of Indigent Defendant in Criminal Case to Aid of State by 
Appointment of Investigator or Expert, 34 A.L.R.3d 1256 (1970 & 1983 
Supp.). 
For commentary urging the recognition of a constitutional right, under 
certain conditions, to psychiatric assistance see Goldstein and Fine, The 
Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1061 (1962); Note, Criminal Law: Indigent Defendant's Right to 
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Congress recognized the imperative need to provide indi-
gents with access to experts by enacting 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3006A(e). Section 3006A(e) entitles a defendant in a fed-
eral criminal trial to obtain the service of experts, including 
psychiatrists, if he cannot otherwise afford such services and 
if the psychiatrists assistance is "necessary for an adequate 
defense." 9 Similar statutes have been enacted by at least 
forty states. 10 What these federal and state statutes reflect 
is a widespread recognition that when an indigent defendant 
asserts a colorable insanity defense, it is fundamentally un-
fair to try him without providing him with at least some mini-
mal degree of assistance in presenting his defense through 
expert testimony by a psychiatrist. 11 
It is difficult to imagine a case where expert testimony is as 
essential to a constitutionally adequate trial as where a de-
fendant, facing a possible death sentence, pleads not guilty 
by reason of insanity. An extraordinary amount of attention 
Independent Psychiatrist, 7 Tulsa L. Rev. 137 (1971); Note, The lndigent's 
Right to An Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational Assistance in 
Criminal Proceedings, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 632 (1970); Note, Right to Aid in 
Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 
1054 (1963). 
9 18 U. S. C. § 3006A(e)(l) provides in pertinent part that counsel for a 
defendant who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other 
services necessary for an adequate defense may request them in an ex 
parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry that in an ex 
parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person is 
financially unable to obtain them, the court shall authorize counsel to ob-
tain the services. The compensation is generally limited to $300 plus re-
imbursement for expenses. Id. (3). 
10 See statutes cited in Recent Developments,-Equal Protection-Re-
fusal to Provide Expert Witness for Indigent Defendant Denies Equal Pro-
tection, 59 Wash. U.L. Quart. 317, 321 n. 18 (1981). See also A. 
Moenssens & F. Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 10 n. 19 
(1978). 
11 See American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed. 
1982): "The quality of representation at trial ... may be excellent and yet 
valueless to the defendant if the defense requires the assistance of a psychi-
atrist ... and no such services are available." Id., at 5.20. 
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has been dedicated to establishing the standard by which to 
define insanity, but the most important factor in determining 
whether a standard-whatever its content-is correctly ap-
plied to a particular individual "is whether the accused has a 
psychiatrist at all to aid him in making his defense." 
Goldstein and Fine, The Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist, 
and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1061, 1061 
(1962) For good or for ill, psychiatrists have become key fig-
ures in the criminal adversarial process; the conclusions they 
draw from their arcane science significantly influence both 
findings of guilt or innocence and determinations of appropri-
ate punishment. 12 The mantle of presumed expertise with 
which our society has cloaked the views of psychiatrists 
makes access to their opinion and testimony essential in a 
trial where insanity is the central issue. 13 Deprived of access 
12 "The opinion of psychiatrists can have substantial or decisive influence 
in the determination of whether a defendant is fit to stand trial, whether he 
is responsible for a crime, and whether he is to be executed or given a life 
sentence." Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and 
Correction, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 650, 650 (1958). See also J. 
Robitscher, The Powers of Psychiatry (1980); Morse, Crazy Behavior, 
Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
527 (1978); Slovenko, The Insanity Defense in the Wake of the Hinkley 
Trial, 14 Rutgers L. J. 373 (1983); Slovenko, Reflections on the Criticisms 
of Psychiatric Expert Testimony, 25 Wayne L. Rev. 37 (1978). 
In recent years there have been a number of highly-publicized cases in 
which psychiatric assistance to the defense reportedly proved of decisive 
importance in obtaining verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity. See, 
e. g., Taylor, Too Much Justice, Harper's 56 (Sept. 1982) (reporting on the 
acquittal by reason of insanity of John W. Hinckley, Jr., accused of having 
attempted to assassinate the President of the United States) 
13 Commenting on the powerful influence of psychiatric testimony, Jus-
TICE BLACKMUN recently observed that in the sentencing phase of a capital 
case the testimony of the state's psychiatrist, "colored in the eyes of an im-
pressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's 
words, equates with death itself." Barefoot v. Estelle, -- U. S. --, 
-- (1983) (JUSTICE BLACKMUN dissenting). 
Commentators have noted the frequently exaggerated influence that ex-
pert psychiatric testimony exerts not only over juries but over lawyers as 
; 
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to the services a psychiatrist offers, a defense attorney as-
serting an insanity defense is ineffectual. 14 
When a defendant, because of indigency, is forced to forgo 
the services of a psychiatrist, the balance of advantage be-
tween the accused and the prosecution tilts decisively and un-
fairly in favor of the latter. This is especially true where, as 
here, the prosecution repeatedly calls to the jury's attention 
the lack of a psychiatrist's opinion as to the sanity of the de-
fendant at the time of the crime. 15 The unfairness is height-
ened still further where the state uses its psychiatrist to es-
tablish an aggravating circumstance in the capital sentencing 
trial of a defendant. 16 Here, the state prosecutor used the 
judges as well. See, e.g., Morse, supra, n. 12, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 
535-536 ("Much of the legal doctrine and operation of the mental health 
legal system depends on the assumptions and learning of mental health sci-
ence. Most lawyers regard mental disorders as arcane and disturbing 
phenomena that are beyond their comprehension and are understooq by 
only a few highly trained experts . . . Lawyers therefore tend to defer 
to mental health experts, and mental health law decisions at all levels, es-
pecially if the proceedings are not truly adversary, are often based more on 
psychiatric reasoning and conclusions than on legal reasoning.") (footnotes 
omitted). 
14 "[It] is a matter of common knowledge, that upon the trial of certain 
issues, such as insanity ... experts are often necessary both for prosecu-
tion and for defense. . . [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage if 
he is unable because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts 
of those against him." Reilly v. Barry, 250 N. Y. 456, 461, 166 N. E. 165, 
167 (1929) (Cardozo, C. J.). 
15 For example, the following colloquy resulted from the State prosecu-
tor's questioning of one of the psychiatrists who examined the petitioner as 
to his competency to stand trial: 
"Q. Is there any place, in any report you have ever seen, or anything you 
have had the benefit to review, that has said this defendant was legally in-
sane in October or November of 1979 [the time when the offense was 
committed]?" 
"A. No, sir." 
"Q. Do you have any opinion as to whether-" 
"A. No, sir." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-45. 
See also App to Pet. for Cert. A-34, A-36, A-49, A-51. 
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testimony of a psychiatrist to establish the petitioner's "fu-
ture dangerousness." 17 By contrast, the petitioner was de-
prived of the opportunity to develop expert testimony which 
might have provided a persuasive rebuttal. That the state 
saw fit to use its own psychiatrist in the prosecution of the 
defendant is a strong indication that, in the circumstances of 
this case, the services of a psychiatrist was not a mere luxury 
but a pressing necessity. 18 
In two recent decisions, this Court has recognized the need 
for an attorney to be aided by a psychiatrist in the prepara-
tion of a case where insanity is the asserted defense. In Es-
telle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981), the Court held that the 
Fifth Amendment prohibited the admission into evidence, 
over the defendant's objection, of statements obtained by a 
state psychiatrist in pretrial interviews in which the defend-
ant was not warned that his responses might be used against 
him. The Court suggested, however, that where a defend-
ant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, he must be 
16 "Securing the services of experts to examine evidence, to advise coun-
sel, and to rebut the prosecution's case is probably the single most critical 
factor in defending a case in which novel scientific evidence is introduced." 
Gianelli, The Admissability of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Col. L. Rev. 1198, 1243 (1980). There 
are, however, widespread disparities between the State's ability to obtain 
the assistance of experts and the ability of defendants, especially, indigent 
defendants to obtain such assistance. Id. at 1244-1245 ("The underlying 
problem is that the 'burden of rebuttal is generally borne . . . by defend-
ants without the economic means to marshall scientific witnesses for the 
battle of the experts.' " (citation omitted)). 
11 See App. to Pet for Cert. A-50, A-64, A-65. 
18 Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S., at 344 ("Lawyers to prosecute 
are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an or-
derly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, 
few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers thay can get to prepare and 
present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and 
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest 
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are ne-
cessities, not luxuries.") 
; 
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deemed to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-in-
crimination in order to allow the State's psychiatrist to exam-
ine him; otherwise, a defendant could deprive the State of 
"the only effective means" it has of controverting his claim of 
insanity. Id., at 465. This suggestion indicates how, in cer-
tain contexts, the Court clearly perceives that psychiatric as-
sistance is crucial to the proper functioning of the adversary 
process. This perception should have pushed the Court to 
grant certiorari in this case. After all, if the State's only ef-
fective means of controverting a defendant's insanity defense 
is through examination of the defendant by the State's psy-
chiatrists, it stands to reason that a defendant's only effective 
means of establishing an insanity defense will also necessarily 
entail the aid of a psychiatrist. 
Barefoot v. Estelle, -- U. S. -- (1983), evinces a simi-
lar acknowledgement that psychiatric assistance on both 
sides is required for the proper functioning of the adversary 
process where sanity is at issue. In Barefoot the Court up-
held the practice of admitting into evidence expert psychi-
atric testimony regarding the future dangerousness of de-
fendants. It stated that "[i]f the jury may make up its mind 
about future dangerousness unaided by psychiatric 
testmony, jurors should not be barred from hearing the 
views of the State's psychiatrists along with opposing views 
of the defendant's doctors." Id., at -- (emphasis added). 
The Court noted that in Barefoot no evidence was offered at 
trial to contradict the testimony of the State's psychiatrists. 
The Court declared, however, that this lack of expert assist-
ance on behalf of the defendant did not undermine the legiti-
macy of the conviction because there had been no indication 
that, despite the defendant's indigency, the trial court had 
refused to provide the defendant with an expert. Id., at n. 
5. Here the trial court did refuse to provide an expert. At 
another point in the opinion, the Court stated that one reason 
why it would allow psychiatric testimony on future danger-
ousness to be admitted into evidence is that the adversary 
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system will be competent to uncover, recognize and take due 
account of any shortcomings in such testimony. Id., at--. 
If, however, the defendant lacks access to a psychiatrist, his 
ability to uncover weaknesses will be hampered, the adver-
sary process will be distorted, and the special carefulness re-
quired of adjudication in capital cases will be compromised. 
Two other factors further underline the fundamental un-
fairness which has tainted the judicial proceedings against 
this petitioner. First, Ake requested the assistance of a 
psychiatrist not at post-conviction proceedings but rather at 
trial where the State's purpose "is to convert a criminal de-
fendant from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 
610 (1974). The Court has recognized that it is precisely at 
this stage, where a presumptively innocent defendant is at-
tempting to ward off the State's accusations of criminality, 
that his claim to state-sponsored assistance in erecting a de-
fense is most compelling. Ibid. 
Second, this case arises from a State's attempt to condemn 
a man to death. In a wide variety of contexts, this Court has 
recognized that the unique character of a capital trial re-
quires that it be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant 
concern for procedural fairness and for the accuracy of 
factfinding. 19 It has thus been noted that "[ w ]hat is essential 
[in the sentencing phase of a capital case] is that the jury 
1
• As I noted in Barefoot v. Estelle, supra, at-, this Court has time 
and again condemned procedures in capital cases that might be acceptable 
in ordinary cases. For example, long before this Court recognized the right 
to counsel in all felony cases, Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, it established 
that right in capital cases, Powell v. Alabama, supra. Other instances in 
which this Court has required more stringent procedural standards in the 
context of a capital trial include the circumstances under which the Double 
Jeopardy Clause can be invoked, Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 
(1981); the circumstances under which a judge must instruct a jury as to 
lesser included offenses, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980); and the 
circumstances under which a trial judge must be allowed to consider miti-
gating evidence, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978). 
; 
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have before it all possible relevant information about the indi-
vidual defendant whose fate it must determine." Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion). Here, 
however, despite the petitioner's plea that he was insane at 
the time of the crime, the State has condemned him to death 
without the benefit of any expert opinion regarding his insan-
ity claim. Moreover, as to the issue of the petitioner's future 
dangerousness, the only expert opinion offered was that of 
the State's psychiatrists. Such one-sidedness made a mock-
ery of the adversary system and tainted the proceedings 
against the petitioner with the sort of egregious unfairness 
which violates the federal constitutional guarantee of Due 
Process. 
Closely related to Ake's claim that he was denied Due 
Process is his claim that he was denied Equal Protection of 
the laws. "There can be no equal justice where the kind of 
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 19 (1956). Yet this case 
presents in extreme fashion the spectacle of indigency sub-
verting our pious allegiance to "EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER 
LAW." Had the petitioner been a man of means, he would 
undoubtedly have obtained the services of a psychiatrist. 
As an indigent, however, petitioner was left bereft of any ac-
cess to the specialized knowledge necessary to an insanity de-
fense. This squalid distinction between the justice afforded 
a person of means asserting an insanity defense and an indi-
gent asserting an insanity defense offends the notion of 
equality that is embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Whenever the Fourteenth Amendment is read to impose 
upon the States "an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps 
flowing from differences in economic circumstances," 20 cer-
tain objections are invariably raised. The most important of 
these objections is that the equality principle articulated in 
Griffin goes too far and knows no stable limits: "Once loosed, 
2!) Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S., at 34 Oustice Harlan dissenting). 
: ; 
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the idea of Equality is not easily cabined." Cox, Constitu-
tional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 
Harv. L. Rev. 91, 91 (1966). Distinguished Justices of this 
Court have warned that there is simply no way consistently 
to administer application of the Griffin principle since a thor-
oughgoing implementation of it would require a level of judi-
cial intervention which would be antithetical to other con-
stitutional values and far outside the institutional capabilities 
of this Court. 21 But in applying the Griffin principle, this 
Court has always been aware of these difficulties and has im-
plemented this principle with a necessary respect for 
practicalities: "Absolute equality is not required; lines can be 
drawn and are drawn and we often sustain them." Douglas 
v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 357 (1963). 22 
21Justice Harlan was perhaps the most articulate critic of the position I 
assert. See, e. g., Id., at 29-39; Douglas v. California, 372 U. S., at 
360-367 (dissenting opinion); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40, 43-44 
(1967) (dissenting opinion). 
22 A useful general response to the fears expressed by Justice Harlan was 
set forth in Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and 
the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (1963): 
"[G]overnmental obligation to deal effectively with problems of poverty in 
the administration of criminal justice . . . does not presuppose a general 
commitment . . . to relieve impoverished persons of the consequences of 
limited means, whenever or however manifested. 
The obligation of government in the criminal cases rests on wholly differ-
ent considerations and reflects principles of much more limited application. 
The essential point is that the problems of poverty with which this Report 
is concerned arise in a process initiated by government for the achieve-
ment of basic governmental purposes. It is, moreover, a process that has 
as one of its consequences the imposition of severe disabilities on the per-
sons proceeded against. . . . When government chooses to exert its pow-
ers in the criminal area, its obligation is surely no less than that of taking 
reasonable measures to eliminate those factors that are irrelevant to just 
administration of the law but which, nevertheless, may occasionally affect 
determinations of the accused's liability or penalty. While government 
may not be required to relieve the accused of his poverty, it may properly 
be required to minimize the influence of poverty on its administration of 
justice." Id., at 9. 
; 
; 
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In this case, two factors serve as reliable lines within which 
to circumscribe application of the Griffin principle. The first 
involves the nature of the assistance the petitioner sought 
from the State. The petitioner sought assistance from the 
State that was essential to effective assistance of counsel. 
Moreover, even if the psychiatric assistance the petitioner 
sought is not deemed a requirement under the Due Process 
Clause, it is nonetheless of sufficient importance in the ad-
ministration of a criminal trial that it cannot be withheld from 
a defendant, solely on account of his indigency, without vi-
olating the Equal Protection Clause. To be sure, it would be 
absurd to require that an indigent be furnished with "every 
possible legal tool, no matter how speculative its value, and 
no matter how devoid of assistance it may be, merely because 
a person of unlimited means might choose to waste his re-
sources in a quest of that kind." United States v. 
MacCollom, 426 u. s. 317, 330 (1976) (JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
concurring) (emphasis added). What the Griffin principle 
does require, however, is that "the State must, as a matter of 
equal protection, provide indigent [defendants] with the 
basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal when those tools 
are available for a price to other [defendants]." Britt v. 
North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226, 227 (1971) (emphasis added). 
Griffin does not mandate a utopian quest for absolute equal-
ity with respect to every aspect of the adversary process, but 
it does mandate substantial equality with respect to impor-
tant features of that process. Psychiatric assistance in a 
capital case in which the defendant pleads not guilty by rea-
son of insanity clearly qualifies as a feature of the adversary 
process important enough to trigger the protection of the 
Equal Protection Clause. 23 
23 In Barefoot v. Estelle, supra, the Court decided that a psychiatrist's 
prediction of a defendant's future dangerousness is properly admissible be-
cause of the ability of the adversarial process to ferret out unreliable testi-
mony. JUSTICE BLACKMUN noted in dissent that "the Court's reasoning 
suggests that, were a defendant to show that he was unable, for financial 
18 AKE v. OKLAHOMA 
The second limiting feature of this case involves the nature 
of the proceeding against the petitioner: he was on trial for 
his life. Because the need for procedural safeguards is par-
ticularly great where life is at stake, there is a corresponding 
need in that context to be especially intolerant of arrange-
ments that make the quality of justice a defendant obtains a 
mere reflection of his position in our society's socio-economic 
hierarchy. Thus, at least with respect to capital cases, the 
Equal Protection Clause requires that states provide defend-
ants asserting a colorable insanity defense with reasonable 
access to expert psychiatric assistance. 
Because it is probable that the ruling of the Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals violates the petitioner's federal 
constitutional rights and because the petitioner has posed im-
portant federal constitutional issues about which there is 
much disagreement among state and federal courts, I dissent 
from the Court's denial of certiorari. 
or other reasons, to obtain an adequate rebuttal expert, a constitutional 
violation might be found." - U. S. at-, n. 12. This case presents 
the very issue that JUSTICE BLACKMUN anticipated, at least with respect 
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JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
This case poses an important federal constitutional issue: 
whether, under any circumstances, a defendant has ~n-
stitutional right to the assistance of a s chiatrist in the 
preparation of is e ense. ffirming the petit10ner s con-
viction and aeath sentence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
Appeals held that the federal constitution imposes no such 
obligation. This holding appears to violate the petitioner's 
right to effective assistance of counsel, a Sixth Amendment 
protection applicable to the States through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963). The holding also appears to vi-
olate the petitioner's rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has pre-
viously indicated a willingness to consider this issue which 
continues to generate conflict between various state and fed-
eral cou s. ha 1 s ca · c ~
to tlieneed to review the issue posed by the petitioner. I 
would therefore vote to grant and respectfully dissent from 
the Court's denial of certiorari. 
I 
In the winter of 1979, in Canadian County, Oklahoma, the 
petitioner, Glen Burton Ake, Jr., was charged with murder-
ing a couple and wounding the couple's two children. Ake v. 
State, 663 P. 2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). At his arraign-
ment the petitioner was ejected for disruptive behavior. 
Subsequently, the judge who presided at the arraignment or-
dered, sua sponte, that Ake be given a psychiatric evaluation 
: 
,. 
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to determine his competency to stand trial. Ake spent ap-
proximately two months at a mental hospital where he was 
evaluated only with respect to his competency to stand trial; 
no evaluation was made concerning his state of mind at the 
time of the crime. On April 10, 1980, after a hearing in 
which several psychiatrists testified to petitioner's lack of 
present sanity, the trial court found Ake to be mentally ill 
and committed him to the state mental hospital. On May 27, 
1980, the trial court reinstated criminal charges against Ake. 
Although the trial judge gave no reason for his decision, it 
appears to have been influenced by a letter written by the 
mental hospital's chief forensic psychiatrist. The letter 
stated that in the opinion of the hospital staff Ake had im-
proved to the point where he would be capable of understand-
ing the charges against him and of aiding his attorney with 
his defense. See App. to Pet. for Cert. A-20. 
Because Ake is indigent and could not afford counsel, the 
court appointed an attorney to represent him. At a pretrial 
conference, the attorney informed the court of the petition-
er's intention to plead not guilty by reason of insanity. The J 
attorney then re uested that the court either a ppoint a psy-
chiatrist to ex~ he petitioner or provide the petitioner 
with the funds necessary to obtain an examination. Accord-
ing to the petitioner's attorney, an expert psychiatric evalua-
tion was needed in order to assert a competent defense. 1 
The trial judge denied this request on the grounds that the 
federal Constitution did not compel the expenditure of funds 
1 Pleading with the trial court for assistance in obtaining the services of a 
psychiatrist, Ake's attorney stated that "[t]o deny to this client ... funds 
for the preparations would be a miscarriage of justice ... because an attor-
ney has got to have . . . funds to properly defend his client. . . . I cannot 
possibly believe [that] a few meager dollars is going to stand between a 
man charged with Murder in the First Degree [and] a constitutional, fair 
and impartial trial. . . . Life, itself is far too precious to consider any 
monetary value that might be expended within reason." See App. to Pet. 
for Cert. at A-30. 
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for an examination and that the court was without statutory 
authority to expend state funds for such a purpose. 2 
The petitioner was tried in one day. He attempted to es-
tablish his insanity defense by calling as witnesses the two 
psychiatrists and the physician who had initially found him to 
be incompetent to stand trial but subsequently found him to 
be competent. None of these witnesses was able to offer an 
opinion about petitioner's sanity at the time of the offense be-
cause they had only examined him for the limited purpose of 
determining his competency to stand trial. The petitioner 
thus received no psychiatric examination relating to his san-
ity at the time of the offense. At the sentencing phase of the 
trial, the State relied on expert psychiatric testimony to es-
tablish the petitioner's "future dangerousness," one of the ag-
gravating circumstances upon which the jury hinged its death 
sentence. 3 Lacking access to a psychiatrist, the petitioner 
2 The trial judge denied the petitioner's request in an oral ruling in 
which he observed that he was "aware of" United States. ex rel. Smith v. 
Baldi 344 U. S. 561 (1953), "in which the U. S. Supreme Court held that a 
State does not have a constitutional duty to provide private psychiatric 
examination to indigent defendants." App to Pet. for Cert. at A-31. The 
trial judge commented further that state law mandates that "courts may 
not-repeat, 'not'-spend any court funds unless specifically authorized by 
statute. This has been more and more strictly construed against courts, 
and so unless I can see some specific authority, I could not even consider 
[granting the defendant's request.] The request for private psychiatric 
evaluation at the expense of the State is denied. You may have the de-
fendant available, if you are able to arrange it, in some other manner." 
Ibid. 
3 Under Oklahoma law, the jury must find at least one statutorily de-
fined aggravating circumstance in order for the death penalty to be im-
posed. See Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.11. In this case, the jury found 
three aggravating circumstances: that the petitioner was likely to commit 
future acts of violence, that the crime was committed to avoid arrest, and 
that the crime was especially cruel, heinous and atrocious. Ake v. State, 
supra, at 11. 
In Zant v. Stephens , -- U. S. -- (1983), this Court upheld the impo-
sition of a death penalty in a case where the jury made multiple findings of 
aggravating circumstances, one of which was invalidated on appeal. The 
Court held that given the particular structure of the death penalty statute 
: ; 
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offered no expert testimony to rebut the opinion of the 
State's expert. 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the con-
viction and the death sentence. Ake v. State, supra. In re-
sponse to the petitioner's claim that the district court had 
erred in not providing him with any expert psychiatric assist-
ance, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that notwithstand-
ing the unique nature of a capital case, "the State does not 
have the responsibility of providing such services to indigents 
charged with capital crimes." Id., at 6. 
II 
In defending the holding of the Court of Appeals, the State 
forgoes any justification of the Court of Appeals' constitu-
tional holding. Instead, the State maintains that the con-
stitutional question need not be reached because, in this case, 
the petitioner failed to put into serious question the issue of 
his sanity at the time of the offense. According to the State, 
petitioner's sanity was never in serious question because he 
had had no prior history of mental illness, reportedly ex-
pressed fear once he learned that the children of the mur-
at issue, the invalidation of one finding of aggravating circumstances did 
not require the invalidation of the sentence as a whole so long as at least 
one valid finding was available to support the imposition of capital punish-
ment. Under the death penalty statute at issue in Zant, the jury was not 
instructed "to balance aggravating against mitigating circumstances pursu-
ant to any special standard." Id., at--. Indeed that statute did not 
require the jury to undertake any balancing of mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances. Id., at--. Oklahoma's death penalty statute, by con-
trast, does require such balancing. It states that "[u]nless at least one of 
the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act is so found 
or if it is found that any such aggravating circumstance is outweighed by 
the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty 
shall not be imposed." Okla. Stat., Tit. 21, § 701.11. The reasoning of 
Zant, then, does not appear to control this case; if one aggravating circum-
stance is invalidated on appeal, the death sentence itself must be vacated 
even in the presence of other, unchallenged findings of aggravating circum-
stances. See Zant v. Stephens, supra, at -- (JUSTICE MARSHALL 
dissenting). 
., 
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dered parents had survived their wounds, and gave a de-
tailed and lucid post-arrest confession. Brief in Opp. 6-8. 
The central problem with this analysis is that it wholly ig-
nores the reason the trial court offered as to why it refused to 
appoint a psychiatrist to aid the petitioner with his insanity 
defense. There is no indication whatsoever that the trial 
court's ruling was predicated upon a finding that petitioner 
had failed to present a colorable showing of insanity at the 
time of the offense. 4 Rather, the trial court rejected peti-
tioner's request for a court-appointed psychiatrist on the 
grounds that it lacked statutory authorization to make such 
an appointment and that the federal Constitution did not 
compel it to satisfy the petitioner's request. The Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court on these 
same grounds. 5 See Ake v. State, 663 P. 2d, at 6. Thus, con-
'Neither the trial court nor the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
made any inquiry into whether the petitioner could make a colorable show-
ing that he was insane at the time of the offense. They apparently as-
sumed that the petitioner would have no constitutional right to psychiatric 
assistance no matter what sort of showing he was capable of making. 
That the petitioner succeeded in raising insanity to the status of a color-
able issue is indicated by the fact that the jury received an insanity instruc-
tion. See Ake v. State, supra, at 10. 
Rejecting the claim that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the 
evidence that the petitioner was not guilty by reason of insanity, the Okla-
homa Court of Appeals held that the petitioner "failed to establish any rea-
sonable doubt as to his sanity at the time the crimes were committed." Id. 
Whether the petitioner established reasonable doubt as to his sanity is a far 
different issue, however, than whether the petitioner made enough of a 
showing to put his sanity into question. While the former relates to the 
final resolution of a claim of insanity, the latter entails a preliminary deci-
sion relating to whether a defendant has made an initial showing substan-
tial enough to warrant the appointment of a psychiatrist. 
· The Oklahoma Court of Appeals also held that the petitioner's claim 
had not been properly preserved in the motion for a new trial and that it 
had thus been waived. Ibid. Assuming that the petitioner failed to sat-
isfy Oklahoma's procedural requirements for preserving claims on appeal, 
this Court can still properly exercise jurisdiction over this case because the 
Oklahoma Courtof Appeals' ruled on the merits of petitioner's constitu-
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trary to the State's suggestion, this Court must indeed reach 
the federal constitutional issue in order properly to adjudi-
cate this case. 
The issue presented by this case is whether, under any cir-
cumstances, a defendant has a federal constitutional right to 
the services of a psychiatrist for the purpose of preparing a 
defense to a criminal prosecution in a state court. The Court 
granted certiorari to consider this question in Bush v. Texas, 
372 U. S. 586 (1963). In Bush an indigent defendant who 
had previously been adjudicated insane was charged and con-
victed of theft. At trial, the defendant pleaded not guilty by 
reason of insanity and requested that the court either send 
him to a state medical institution for observation and diagno-
sis or appoint and pay for a psychiatrist for this purpose. 
The trial judge rejected this request, noting that the court 
"had no fund or money for so-called psychiatrists, alienists, 
quacks or specialists." Brief for Petitioner in Bush v .. 
Texas, 0. T. 1962, No. 511, p. 3. This Court declined to re-
solve this issue only because the Assistant Attorney General 
of Texas indicated at oral argument that he would seek to 
have the defendant retried based upon a post-conviction psy-
chiatric evaluation of the defendant which showed that the 
defendant was then mentally ill and that he may have been 
mentally ill at the time of the crime. Bush v. Texas, supra, 
at 590. 6 
tional claim. A ruling on the merits of a federal question by the highest 
state court leaves the federal question open to review by this Court. See, 
e. g., Franks v. Delaware, 438 U. S. 154, 161-162 (1978) 
6 The trial court evidently believed that United States ex rel. Smith v. 
Baldi, 344 U. S. 561 (1953) decided the issue posed by petitioner for it cited 
Baldi for the proposition that "a State does not have a constitutional duty 
to provide psychiatric examinations to indigent defendants." App. to Pet. 
for Cert. at A-31. Baldi stands for no such proposition. Smith claimed 
that his conviction and death sentence was invalid because the State had 
deprived him of the assistance of a psychiatrist. The Court rejected the 
petitioner's assertion not on the grounds that the federal Constitution did 
not compel the provision of a psychiatrist but rather on the grounds that, in 
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Equally as significant as the Court's previous willingness 
to consider the issue posed by this case, is the history of Bush 
subsequent to this Court's remand. In state court, the de-
fendant was found to be sane. A federal district court, how-
ever, granted habeas corpus relief to the defendant on the 
grounds that the state court had failed to provide the peti-
tioner with an adequate process by which to establish his in-
sanity claim. Bush v. McCollum, 231 F. Supp. 560 (ND 
Tex. 1964), aff'd, 334 F. 2d 672 (CA5 1965). More specifi-
cally, the federal district court ruled that the state court had 
violated the defendant's right to effective assistance of coun-
sel by refusing, prior to trial, either to commit the defendant 
fact, the petitioner had had the benefit of a psychiatric evaluation as to his 
sanity at the time of the crime and that that evaluation sufficed to satisfy 
the requirements of due process. 344 U. S., at 568. 
One sentence in Baldi, if quoted out of context, seems to support the in-
terpretation of the holding urged by respondent. In that sentence, the 
Court remarked that a State does not have the duty by federal constitu-
tional mandate to appoint a psychiatrist to make a pretrial examination. 
Ibid. What the Court clearly meant was that a State was under no con-
stitutional compulsion to provide a defendant with psychiatric assistance 
once a court-appointed psychiatrist had examined the defendant as to his 
sanity at the time of the crime and presented to the jury his expert opinion 
on the issue. Because the defendant had had the benefit of at least some 
expert testimony regarding his alleged insanity at the time of the offense, 
the Court found that the requirements of due process were satisfied. In 
the words of the Court, "the issue of petitioner's sanity was heard by the 
trial court. Psychiatrists testified. That suffices." Id. Here, by con-
trast, no psychiatrist testified as to the petitioner's sanity at the time of 
the offense. 
Apart from being readily distinguishable on the facts, Baldi offers little 
precedential value with respect to the legal issues at stake here because it 
predates this Court's enlargement of the affirmative duty of the states to 
provide to indigent defendants the legal tools necesary for a fair trial. 
Among the landmark decisions that postdate Baldi and erode the proposi-
tion for which the the trial court cited it are Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 
(1956) (constitutional right to transcript for appeal as ofright from criminal 
conviction), Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963) (constitutional 
right to counsel in felony trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353 (1963) 
(constitutional right to counsel for direct appeal). 
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to a state facility for examination or to appoint a psychiatrist 
to examine him. The federal district court justified its rul-
ing by observing that "the right to counsel is meaningless if 
the lawyer is unable to make an effective defense because he 
has no funds to provide the specialized testimony which the 
case requires." Id., at 565. 7 Other courts have indicated 
support for the analysis suggested by Bush, especially in the 
context of a capital case. See, e. g., Blake v. Zant, 513 F. 
Supp. 772, 787 (SD Ga. 1981) (habeas corpus relief granted 
because "in a capital case, a defendant whose sanity at the 
time of the alleged crime is fairly in question , has at a mini-
mum the constitutional right to at least one psychiatric 
examination at state expense.") (emphasis in original). 8 
' The Sixth Amendment guarantees, in pertinent part, that "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions , the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the 
Assistance of counsel." The Court has long recognized, however, that 
this right is vitiated when the circumstances surrounding the appointment 
of counsel deny a defendant "effective and substantial aid." Alabama v. 
Powell, 287 U. S. 45, 53 (1932). See also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 
U. S. 475, 489-490 (1978); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, 446 (1940). 
Similarly, this Court has prohibited government conduct that would render 
ineffective an attorney's assistance to a defendant. See, e.g., Moore v. 
Illinois, 434 U. S. 220 (1977); Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80 (1976); 
United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967). 
8 See also Hintz v. Beto, 379 F. 2d 937, 941-943 (CA5 1967); Jacobs v. 
United States, 350 F. 2d 571, 573 (CA41965); United States ex rel. Robin-
son v. Pate, 345 F. 2d 691, 695-696 (CA7 1965), aff'd in part and remanded 
in part on other grounds 383 U. S. 375. But see Watson v. Patterson, 358 
F. 2d 297 (CAlO), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 876 (1966); United States ex rel. 
Huguley v. Martin, 325 F. Supp. 489, 492-493(ND Ga. 1971); Houghtaling 
v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 309, 163 S. E. 2d 560, 562 (1968) cert. denied 
394 U. S. 1021 (1969). A useful listing of relevant cases is contained in 
Weeks, Right of Indigent Defendant in Criminal Case to Aid of State by 
Appointment of Investigator or Expert, 34 A.L.R.3d 1256 (1970 & 1983 
Supp.). 
For commentary urging the recognition of a constitutional right, under 
certain conditions, to psychiatric assistance see Goldstein and Fine, The 
Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist, and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 1061 (1962); Note, Criminal Law: Indigent Defendant's Right to 
: ; 
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Congress recognized the imperative need to provide indi-
gents with access to experts by enacting 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3006A(e). Section 3006A(e) entitles a defendant in a fed-
eral criminal trial to obtain the service of experts, including 
psychiatrists, if he cannot otherwise afford such services and 
if the psychiatrists assistance is "necessary for an adequate 
defense." 9 Similar statutes have been enacted by at least 
forty states. 10 What these federal and state statutes reflect 
is a widespread recognition that when an indigent defendant 
asserts a colorable insanity defense, it is fundamentally un-
fair to try him without providing him with at least some mini-
mal degree of assistance in presenting his defense through 
expert testimony by a psychiatrist. 11 
It is difficult to imagine a case where expert testimony is as 
essential to a constitutionally adequate trial as where a de-
fendant, facing a possible death sentence, pleads not guilty 
by reason of insanity. An extraordinary amount of attention 
Independent Psychiatrist, 7 Tulsa L. Rev. 137 (1971); Note, The Indigent's 
Right to An Adequate Defense: Expert and Investigational Assistance in 
Criminal Proceedings, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 632 (1970); Note, Right to Aid in 
Addition to Counsel for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 47 Minn. L. Rev. 
1054 (1963). 
9 18 U. S. C. § 3006A(e)(l) provides in pertinent part that counsel for a 
defendant who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other 
services necessary for an adequate defense may request them in an ex 
parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry that in an ex 
parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person is 
financially unable to obtain them, the court shall authorize counsel to ob-
tain the services. The compensation is generally limited to $300 plus re-
imbursement for expenses. Id. (3) . 
10 See statutes cited in Recent Developments,-Equal Protection-Re-
fusal to Provide Expert Witness for Indigent Defendant Denies Equal Pro-
tection, 59 Wash. U.L. Quart. 317, 321 n. 18 (1981). See also A. 
Moenssens & F. Inbau, Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases 10 n. 19 
(1978). 
11 See American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed. 
1982): "The quality of representation at trial ... may be excellent and yet 
valueless to the defendant if the defense requires the assistance of a psychi-
atrist ... and no such services are available." Id. , at 5.20. 
: ; 
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has been dedicated to establishing the standard by which to 
define insanity, but the most important factor in determining 
whether a standard-whatever its content-is correctly ap-
plied to a particular individual "is whether the accused has a 
psychiatrist at all to aid him in making his defense." 
Goldstein and Fine, The Indigent Accused, The Psychiatrist, 
and the Insanity Defense, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1061, 1061 
(1962) For good or for ill, psychiatrists have become key fig-
ures in the criminal adversarial process; the conclusions they 
draw from their arcane science significantly influence both 
findings of guilt or innocence and determinations of appropri-
ate punishment. 12 The mantle of presumed expertise with 
which our society has cloaked the views of psychiatrists 
makes access to their opinion and testimony essential in a 
trial where insanity is the central issue. 13 Deprived of access 
'
2 "The opinion of psychiatrists can have substantial or decisive influence 
in the determination of whether a defendant is fit to stand trial, whether he 
is responsible for a crime, and whether he is to be executed or given a life 
sentence." Hakeem, A Critique of the Psychiatric Approach to Crime and 
Correction, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 650, 650 (1958). See also J. 
Robitscher, The Powers of Psychiatry (1980); Morse, Crazy Behavior, 
Morals and Science: An Analysis of Mental Health Law, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 
527 (1978); Slovenko, The Insanity Defense in the Wake of the Hinkley 
Trial, 14 Rutgers L. J. 373 (1983); Slovenko, Reflections on the Criticisms 
of Psychiatric Expert Testimony, 25 Wayne L. Rev. 37 (1978). 
In recent years there have been a number of highly-publicized cases in 
which psychiatric assistance to the defense reportedly proved of decisive 
importance in obtaining verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity. See, 
e. g., Taylor, Too Much Justice, Harper's 56 (Sept. 1982) (reporting on the 
acquittal by reason of insanity of John W. Hinckley, Jr., accused of having 
attempted to assassinate the President of the United States) 
13 Commenting on the powerful influence of psychiatric testimony, Jus-
TICE BLACKMUN recently observed that in the sentencing phase of a capital 
case the testimony of the state's psychiatrist, "colored in the eyes of an im-
pressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist's 
words, equates with death itself." Barefoot v. Estelle, -- U. S. --, 
-- (1983) (JUSTICE BLACKMUN dissenting). 
Commentators have noted the frequently exaggerated influence that ex-
pert psychiatric testimony exerts not only over juries but over lawyers as 
; 
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to the services a psychiatrist offers, a defense attorney as-
serting an insanity defense is ineffectual. 14 
When a defendant, because of indigency, is forced to forgo 
the services of a psychiatrist, the balance of advantage be-
tween the accused and the prosecution tilts decisively and un-
fairly in favor of the latter. This is especially true where, as 
here, the prosecution repeatedly calls to the jury's attention 
the lack of a psychiatrist's opinion as to the sanity of the de-
fendant at the time of the crime. 15 The unfairness is height-
ened still further where the state uses its psychiatrist to es-
tablish an aggravating circumstance in the capital sentencing 
trial of a defendant. 16 Here, the state prosecutor used the 
judges as well. See, e. g., Morse, supra, n. 12, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. at 
535-536 ("Much of the legal doctrine and operation of the mental health 
legal system depends on the assumptions and learning of mental health sci-
ence. Most lawyers regard mental disorders as arcane and disturbing 
phenomena that are beyond their comprehension and are understood by 
only a few highly trained experts . . . Lawyers therefore tend to defer 
to mental health experts, and mental health law decisions at all levels, es-
pecially if the proceedings are not truly adversary, are often based more on 
psychiatric reasoning and conclusions than on legal reasoning.") (footnotes 
omitted). 
""[It] is a matter of common knowledge, that upon the trial of certain 
issues, such as insanity . . . experts are often necessary both for prosecu-
tion and for defense. . . [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage if 
he is unable because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts 
of those against him." Reilly v. Barry, 250 N. Y. 456,461, 166 N. E. 165, 
167 (1929) (Cardozo, C. J.). 
16 For example, the following colloquy resulted from the State prosecu-
tor's questioning of one of the psychiatrists who examined the petitioner as 
to his competency to stand trial: 
"Q. Is there any place, in any report you have ever seen, or anything you 
have had the benefit to review, that has said this defendant was legally in-
sane in October or November of 1979 [the time when the offense was 
committed]?" 
"A. No, sir." 
"Q. Do you have any opinion as to whether-" 
"A. No, sir." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-45. 
See also App to Pet. for Cert. A-34, A-36, A-49, A-51. 
: ; 
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testimony of a psychiatrist to establish the petitioner's "fu-
ture dangerousness." 11 By contrast, the petitioner was de-
prived of the opportunity to develop expert testimony which 
might have provided a persuasive rebuttal. That the state 
saw fit to use its own psychiatrist in the prosecution of the 
defendant is a strong indication that, in the circumstances of 
this case, the services of a psychiatrist was not a mere luxury 
but a pressing necessity. 18 
In two recent decisions, this Court has recognized the need 
for an attorney to be aided by a psychiatrist in the prepara-
tion of a case where insanity is the asserted defense. In Es-
telle v. Smith, 451 U. S. 454 (1981), the Court held that the 
Fifth Amendment prohibited the admission into evidence, 
over the defendant's objection, of statements obtained by a 
state psychiatrist in pretrial interviews in which the defend-
ant was not warned that his responses might be used against 
him. The Court suggested, however, that where a defend-
ant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity, he must be 
16 "Securing the services of experts to examine evidence, to advise coun-
sel, and to rebut the prosecution's case is probably the single most critical 
factor in defending a case in which novel scientific evidence is introduced." 
Gianelli, The Admissability of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United 
States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Col. L. Rev. 1198, 1243 (1980). There 
are, however, widespread disparities between the State's ability to obtain 
the assistance of experts and the ability of defendants, especially, indigent 
defendants to obtain such assistance. Id. at 1244-1245 ("The underlying 
problem is that the 'burden of rebuttal is generally borne ... by defend-
ants without the economic means to marshall scientific witnesses for the 
battle of the experts.'" (citation omitted)). 
17 See App. to Pet for Cert. A-50, A-64, A-65. 
,a Cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S., at 344 ("Lawyers to prosecute 
are everywhere deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an or-
derly society. Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, 
few indeed, who fail to hire the best lawyers thay can get to prepare and 
present their defenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and 
defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest 
indications of the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are ne-
cessities, not luxuries.'') 
: ; 
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deemed to waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-in-
crimination in order to allow the State's psychiatrist to exam-
ine him; otherwise, a defendant could deprive the State of 
"the only effective means" it has of controverting his claim of 
insanity. Id., at 465. This suggestion indicates how, in cer-
tain contexts, the Court clearly perceives that psychiatric as-
sistance is crucial to the proper functioning of the adversary 
process. This perception should have pushed the Court to 
grant certiorari in this case. After all, if the State's only ef-
fective means of controverting a defendant's insanity defense 
is through examination of the defendant by the State's psy-
chiatrists, it stands to reason that a defendant's only effective 
means of establishing an insanity defense will also necessarily 
entail the aid of a psychiatrist. 
Barefoot v. Estelle, -- U. S. -- (1983), evinces a simi-
lar acknowledgement that psychiatric assistance on both 
sides is required for the proper functioning of the adversary 
process where sanity is at issue. In Barefoot the Court up-
held the practice of admitting into evidence expert psychi-
atric testimony regarding the future dangerousness of de-
fendants. It stated that "[i]f the jury may make up its mind 
about future dangerousness unaided by psychiatric 
testmony, jurors should not be barred from hearing the 
views of the State's psychiatrists along with opposing views 
of the defendant's doctors." Id., at -- (emphasis added). 
The Court noted that in Barefoot no evidence was offered at 
trial to contradict the testimony of the State's psychiatrists. 
The Court declared, however, that this lack of expert assist-
ance on behalf of the defendant did not undermine the legiti-
macy of the conviction because there had been no indication 
that, despite the defendant's indigency, the trial court had 
refused to provide the defendant with an expert. Id., at n. 
5. Here the trial court did refuse to provide an expert. At 
another point in the opinion, the Court stated that one reason 
why it would allow psychiatric testimony on future danger-
ousness to be admitted into evidence is that the adversary 
: ; 
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system will be competent to uncover, recognize and take due 
account of any shortcomings in such testimony. Id., at--. 
If, however, the defendant lacks access to a psychiatrist, his 
ability to uncover weaknesses will be hampered, the adver-
sary process will be distorted, and the special carefulness re-
quired of adjudication in capital cases will be compromised. 
Two other factors further underline the fundamental un-
fairness which has tainted the judicial proceedings against 
this petitioner. First, Ake requested the assistance of a 
psychiatrist not at post-conviction proceedings but rather at 
trial where the State's purpose "is to convert a criminal de-
fendant from a person presumed innocent to one found guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U. S. 600, 
610 (1974). The Court has recognized that it is precisely at 
this stage, where a presumptively innocent defendant is at-
tempting to ward off the State's accusations of criminality, 
that his claim to state-sponsored assistance in erecting a de-
fense is most compelling. Ibid. 
Second, this case arises from a State's attempt to condemn 
a man to death. In a wide variety of contexts, this Court has 
recognized that the unique character of a capital trial re-
quires that it be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant 
concern for procedural fairness and for the accuracy of 
factfinding. 19 It has thus been noted that "[ w ]hat is essential 
[in the sentencing phase of a capital case] is that the jury 
19 As I noted in Barefoot v. Estelle, supra, at-, this Court has time 
and again condemned procedures in capital cases that might be acceptable 
in ordinary cases. For example, long before this Court recognized the right 
to counsel in all felony cases, Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, it established 
that right in capital cases, Powell v. Alabama, supra. Other instances in 
which this Court has required more stringent procedural standards in the 
context of a capital trial include the circumstances under which the Double 
Jeopardy Clause can be invoked, Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U. S. 430 
(1981); the circumstances under which a judge must instruct a jury as to 
lesser included offenses, Beck v. Alabama, 447 U. S. 625 (1980); and the 
circumstances under which a trial judge must be allowed to consider miti-
gating evidence, Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978). 
AKE v. OKLAHOMA 15 
have before it all possible relevant information about the indi-
vidual defendant whose fate it must determine." Jurek v. 
Texas, 428 U. S. 262, 276 (1976) (plurality opinion). Here, 
however, despite the petitioner's plea that he was insane at 
the time of the crime, the State has condemned him to death 
without the benefit of any expert opinion regarding his insan-
ity claim. Moreover, as to the issue of the petitioner's future 
dangerousness, the only expert opinion offered was that of 
the State's psychiatrists. Such one-sidedness made a mock-
ery of the adversary system and tainted the proceedings 
against the petitioner with the sort of egregious unfairness 
which violates the federal constitutional guarantee of Due 
Process. 
Closely related to Ake's claim that he was denied Due 
Process is his claim that he was denied Equal Protection of 
the laws. "There can be no equal justice where the kind of 
trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has." 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12, 19 (1956). Yet this case 
presents in extreme fashion the spectacle of indigency sub-
verting our pious allegiance to "EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER 
LAW." Had the petitioner been a man of means, he would 
undoubtedly have obtained the services of a psychiatrist. 
As an indigent, however, petitioner was left bereft of any ac-
cess to the specialized knowledge necessary to an insanity de-
fense. This squalid distinction between the justice afforded 
a person of means asserting an insanity defense and an indi-
gent asserting an insanity defense offends the notion of 
equality that is embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Whenever the Fourteenth Amendment is read to impose 
upon the States "an affirmative duty to lift the handicaps 
flowing from differences in economic circumstances," 20 cer-
tain objections are invariably raised. The most important of 
these objections is that the equality principle articulated in 
Griffin goes too far and knows no stable limits: "Once loosed, 
20 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S., at 34 gustice Harlan dissenting). 
16 AKE v. OKLAHOMA 
the idea of Equality is not easily cabined." Cox, Constitu-
tional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 
Harv. L. Rev. 91, 91 (1966). Distinguished Justices of this 
Court have warned that there is simply no way consistently 
to administer application of the Griffin principle since a thor-
oughgoing implementation of it would require a level of judi-
cial intervention which would be antithetical to other con-
stitutional values and far outside the institutional capabilities 
of this Court. 21 But in applying the Griffin principle, this 
Court has always been aware of these difficulties and has im-
plemented this principle with a necessary respect for 
practicalities: "Absolute equality is not required; lines can be 
drawn and are drawn and we often sustain them." Douglas 
v. California, 372 U. S. 353, 357 (1963). 22 
21 Justice Harlan was perhaps the most articulate critic of the position I 
assert. See, e.g., Id., at 29-39; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S., at 
360--367 (dissenting opinion); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U. S. 40, 43-44 
(1967) (dissenting opinion). 
22 A useful general response to the fears expressed by Justice Harlan was 
set forth in R eport of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and 
the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (1963): 
"[G]overnmental obligation to deal effectively with problems of poverty in 
the administration of criminal justice ... does not presuppose a general 
commitment . .. to relieve impoverished persons of the consequences of 
limited means, whenever or however manifested. 
The obligation of government in the criminal cases rests on wholly differ-
ent considerations and reflects principles of much more limited application. 
The essential point is that the problems of poverty with which this Report 
is concerned arise in a process initiated by government for the achieve-
ment of basic governmental purposes. It is, moreover, a process that has 
as one of its consequences the imposition of severe disabilities on the per-
sons proceeded against. . . . When government chooses to exert its pow-
ers in the criminal area, its obligation is surely no less than that of taking 
reasonable measures to eliminate those factors that are irrelevant to just 
administration of the law but which, nevertheless, may occasionally affect 
determinations of the accused's liability or penalty. While government 
may not be required to relieve the accused of his poverty, it may properly 
be required to minimize the influence of poverty on its administration of 
justice." Id. , at 9. 
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In this case, two factors serve as reliable lines within which 
to circumscribe application of the Griffin principle. The first 
involves the nature of the assistance the petitioner sought 
from the State. The petitioner sought assistance from the 
State that was essential to effective assistance of counsel. 
Moreover, even if the psychiatric assistance the petitioner 
sought is not deemed a requirement under the Due Process 
Clause, it is nonetheless of sufficient importance in the ad-
ministration of a criminal trial that it cannot be withheld from 
a defendant, solely on account of his indigency, without vi-
olating the Equal Protection Clause. To be sure, it would be 
absurd to require that an indigent be furnished with "every 
possible legal tool, no matter how speculative its value, and 
no matter how devoid of assistance it may be, merely because 
a person of unlimited means might choose to waste his re-
sources in a quest of that kind." United States v. 
MacCollom, 426 u. s. 317, 330 (1976) (JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
concurring) (emphasis added). What the Griffin principle 
does require, however, is that "the State must, as a matter of 
equal protection, provide indigent [defendants] with the 
basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal when those tools 
are available for a price to other [defendants]." Britt v. 
North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226, 227 (1971) (emphasis added). 
Griffin does not mandate a utopian quest for absolute equal-
ity with respect to every aspect of the adversary process, but 
it does mandate substantial equality with respect to impor-
tant features of that process. Psychiatric assistance in a 
capital case in which the defendant pleads not guilty by rea-
son of insanity clearly qualifies as a feature of the adversary 
process important enough to trigger the protection of the 
Equal Protection Clause. 23 
28 In Barefoot v. Estelle, supra, the Court decided that a psychiatrist's 
prediction of a defendant's future dangerousness is properly admissible be-
cause of the ability of the adversarial process to ferret out unreliable testi-
mony. JUSTICE BLACKMUN noted in dissent that "the Court's reasoning 
suggests that, were a defendant to show that he was unable, for financial 
: ; 
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The second limiting feature of this case involves the nature 
of the proceeding against the petitioner: he was on trial for 
his life. Because the need for procedural safeguards is par-
ticularly great where life is at stake, there is a corresponding 
need in that context to be especially intolerant of arrange-
ments that make the quality of justice a defendant obtains a 
mere reflection of his position in our society's socio-economic 
hierarchy. Thus, at least with respect to capital cases, the 
Equal Protection Clause requires that states provide defend-
ants asserting a colorable insanity defense with reasonable 
access to expert psychiatric assistance. 
Because it is probable that the ruling of the Oklahoma 
Court of Criminal Appeals violates the petitioner's federal 
constitutional rights and because the petitioner has posed im-
portant federal constitutional issues about which there is 
much disagreement among state and federal courts, I dissent 
from the Court's denial of certiorari. 
or other reasons, to obtain an adequate rebuttal expert, a constitutional 
violation might be found." - U. S. at-, n. 12. This case presents 
the very issue that JUSTICE BLACKMUN anticipated, at least with respect 
to petitioner's inability to obtain a psychiatrist at the sentencing phase of 
his trial. 
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This is a brief memo, after a preliminary look at the 
briefs, to refresh my memory. 
This is a capital case in which petitioner was 
convicted of the inhuman murders of a minister and his 
wife, and attempted murders of the two children (in 
addition to attempted rape of one). Petitioner was 
sentenced to death. No question is raised as to his 
guilt. His only defense was insanity at the time of the 
crimes. The principle question is whether an indigent 
defendant whose defense is insanity at the time of his 
crime, has a constitutional right to psychiatric 
examination and assistance in support of his defense? 
There are a couple of other questions in the case. 
One that is important relates to the second phase at which 
counsel from the state relied on "future dangerousness" as 
an aggravating factor, and supported that by reliance on 
psychiatric testimony of state psychiatrists. These 
psychiatrists had examined the defendant only to determine 
; 
whether he was fit mentally to stand trial. Relying 
supported 
defendant 
solely on these examinations, 
the state's "dangerousness" 
these witnesses 
argument. The 
previously had been placed in a mental institution on the 
basis of examination by these psychiatrists. After 
treatment there, they concluded he was fit to stand trial. 
Framed as a separate question, the right to have 
psychiatric assistance provided by the state is claimed 
both for the guilt and sentencing stages of a capital case 
trial. 
My recollection is that I voted to deny cert in this 
case primarily because the Oklahoma Court of Appeals found 
that the defendant had waived his constitutional claim by 
not raising it at trial. I thought this was not a good 
case to address the constitutional issue at least until we 
had the benefit of a federal court's view on haebous 
corpus. 
I am now persuaded that there 
Appointed counsel for the defendant 
repeatedly requested that the state 
expense, a psychiatrist to examine 
, ~ 
was no waivet. 
explicitly and 
provide, at its 
and assist the 
defendant with respect to his defense that he was insane 
at the time of the murders. Counsel argued that an 
indigent was as entitled to this sort of expert assistance 
as to a defendant's constitutional right to counsel. 
There are a number of briefs, and I have not read 
them all. I have taken a look - though a preliminary one 
- at the briefs of the parties. 
Of those that I have read, the best and most helfful 
brief is filed by my former law clerk Joel Kline on behalf 
of the American Psychiatric Association. There is a 
somewhat similar brief filed on behalf of The American 
Psychological Association. The National League of Aid and 
Defense Association also has filed a brief supporting the 
claimed constitutional right. 
I am tentatively inclined to think that there is a 
constitutional to have the assistance of competent medical 








To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Lee 
No. 83-5424, Ake v. 
~~~·-
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
October 24, 1984 
I. Does the Griffin-Douglas principle require a state court 
to appoint a psychiatrist to assist an indigent defendant who 
raises the insanity defense? 
II. In a capital case, if the state relies upon expert 
testimony to establish an indigent defendant's "future 
dangerousness," must he be provided a psychiatrist to assist 
him in rebutting this claim? 
III. was the trial judge required to order a competency 
hearing when the heavily medicated defendant refused to talk 
to his attorney at trial and appeared unconcerned with the 
proceedings against him? 
BACKGROUND 
On October 15, 1979, petitioner and Steven Hatch 
drove a borrowed car to the home of Rev. and Mrs. Richard 
Douglass, near Kingfisher, Oklahoma. They gained entrance to 
the home under the pretense of making a phone call, and then 
forced the entire Douglass family into the living room. 
Reverend Douglass, his wife, 
were bound and gagged on 
and their sixteen year old son 
the living room floor. After 
petitioner failed in several attempts to rape the Douglasses' 
twelve year old daughter, she was bound and placed with the 
rest of her family. The two men ransacked the house, and 
took some valuables and cash. Then, while Hatch waited in 
the car, petitioner shot all four members of the Douglass 
family in the back with a .357 magnum pistol. Reverend and 
Mrs. Douglass died; the two children survived. 
About one month later, petitioner was arrested in 
Colorado. The evidence of his guilt was overwhelming. His 
fingerprints were found in the Douglasses' home, and he had 
used their credit cards to finance extensive travels. 
Following his extradition, petitioner was identified in a 
line-up by the Douglass children. After his arrest, 
petitioner gave the police a detailed confession. 
'= --.... 
On February 14, 1980, petitioner was arraigned 
before the district court of Canadian County, Oklahoma. 
Ake's behavior at the arraignment was "so bizarre" that the --court sua sponte ordered a psychiatric examination. Dr. 
diagnosed Ake as a paranoid schizophrenic, and 
"more prolonged psychiatric examination." The 
district court subsequently ordered petitioner committed to 
the Eastern State Hospital in Vinita, Oklahoma, so that he 
could be examined with respect to his "present sanity." 
On April 1, 1980, a special hearing was held to /~ 
___, determine petitioner's competency to stand trial. ~ 
i~ lh'~ from the state hospital, testified that petitioner was a 
11
J),A1_V". -parnoid schizophrenic unable to under stand fully what was r. ~~ 
going on around him. Dr. Allen testified that petitioner was 
I\ 
a "dangerous psychotic" who could not tell the difference 
between right and wrong. At the close of the hearing, the 
district judge found that petitioner was a "mentally i11 b C 
'- -
person in need of care and treatment" and ordered him 
recommitted to the state mental hospital. Pursuant to state 
statute, all criminal proceedings were suspended. 
Stat. Tit. 22 § 1171 (1971). 
Okla. 
Six weeks later, 
~
Psychiatrist at the state 
the Chief Forensic 
reported to the court 
that petitioner had become competent to stand trial. The 
,......, ,,.., 
psychiatrist noted that the petitioner was given a 200 
; 
,. . 
milligram dose of Thorazine three times each day. The doctor 
stated if this treatment were continued, Ake would be able to 
assist his attorney in trial preparations. On the basis of 
Dr. Garcia's report, the district court ordered the t)-c:_ 
resumption of criminal proceedings against Ake. ~ 
A pretrial conference was held on June 13, 1980. 
The petitioner's court-appointed attorney informed the judge 
that he needed the assistance of a psychiatrist for trial 
preparation. The attorney planned to rely upon the insanity 
defense, which requires a showing that the defendant did not 
know the difference between right and wrong at the time he 
committed the criminal act, and none of the psychiatrist who 
-.._/ ( had examined Ake had attempted to determine his mental state 
~ ( at the time of the murders. Although the defense attorney 
II{(' ro---rv argued that the appointment of a psychiatrist was mandated by 
~~ the federal constitution, the district judge denied the 
~~ motion on the basis of United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 
~ 344 U.S. 561 (1953). According to the judge, the Baldi Court ~ 
~l,.AIJ held that a state "does not have a constitutional duty to ~ 
µJ, ~ rovide private psychiatric examination to indigent~ 
tfV' defendants." ~~~ 
Petitioner's two day trial commenced on June 24, 
1980. The only significant issue was petitioner's ~ty at 5""~ 
~ 
the time of the murders. The defense called three witnesses: 
Dr. Allen, Dr. Garcia, and Dr. Enos. ~ 11 three ) testified 
that petitioner suffered from schizophrenia of the paranoid 
type, and that during psychotic episodes, he saw himself as a 
"sword of vengeance." On cross-examination, each doctor -
explained that he had not evaluated Ake with respect to his -------~ -~ -- -
mental state at the time of the crimes, and therefore could 
express no valid medical opinion on that question. This 
crucial deficiency was stressed repeatedly by the prosecutor 
during his closing argument. 
The jury rejected petitioner's insanity defense, and 
found Ake guilty of two counts of first degree murder, and 
two counts of shooting with intent to kill. At the 
sentencing phase, the prosecutor argued that petitioner would 
pose a "continuing threat to society," an aggravating factor 
under the Oklahoma death penalty statute. Although the 
proscutor did not present any additional evidence, he asked 
the jury to consider the "guilt-phase" testimony of Dr. 
Garcia, a defense witness. Dr. Garcia had stated on cross-
examination that petitioner was likely to commit violent 
er imes in the future. The defense lawyer presented no new 
evidence to rebut this testimony. 
The jury sentenced Ake to death. It found three --- -aggravating factors, including ~ re dangerousn~ ~ 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed 
Ake's convictions and the imposition of the death sentence. 
The court held that the state was not required by the 
constitution to provide an indigent defendant with a court-
appointed psychiatrist. Therefore, the district court's 
refusal to grant the petitioner's pretrial motion did not 




Furthermore, the appellate court held that this claim was 
waived because it had not been preserved in the motion for a 
new trial. 
Ake further argued that the Thorazine treatment he 
received made him unable to understand the nature and the 
object of the proceedings against him. While acknowledging 
that petitioner had remained mute throughout the trial, the 
.... ------- ----
appellate court rejected petitioner's incompetency claim. 
The court noted that the medication had not been administered 
solely to render Ake "sufficiently tranquil to facilitate 
progress of criminal proceedings instituted against him," 
but instead to "normalize" him. The Court of Criminal 
Appeals stated that if a defendant is "rendered competent to 
assist in his defense through the use of medication, it is in 
the best interests of justice to afford him a speedy trial." 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court declined to exercise its . 
discretionary jurisdiction to hear petitioner's appeal. 
DISCUSSION 
I. An Indigent's Right to a Psychiatric Examination 
Petitioner contends that his constitutional rights 
were violated by the trial court's refusal to appoint a 
psychiatrist. The Court of Criminal Appeals found, however, 
that this claim was waived because it was "not preserved in 
the motion for a new trial." It is a well-settled rule in 
Oklahoma that an argument cannot be made on appeal unless 
/~~ 
preserved by a motion for a new trial. See Irvin v. State, 
617 P.2d 588 (Okl.Cr.1980). This procedural requirement 
cannot be viewed either as an attempt by the state court to 
evade petitioner's vindication of federal rights, or as the 
type of rule that generally discriminates against the raising 
~~£t;;;::I 
of federal claims. Therefore, because the judgment below 
1 
rests on independent and adequate state grounds, this Court 
should not consider petitioner's claim. 1 




In Griffin v. 
judgment probably should be 
Illinois, 351 u. s. 12 (1955), the 
Court held that the state could not deny a trial transcript 
appeal. Similarly, in / o indigent er iminal defendants on 
Douglas v. California, 372 u.s. 353 (1963), the Court 
invalidated a statute that required indigent defendants to 
make some preliminary showing of merit prior to the 
appointment of appellate counsel. In both of these cases, 
the Court used the Equal Protection Clause and the Due 
Process Clause to ensure that the "type of trial that a man 
gets [does not) depend[) on the amount of money that he has." 
Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19. Applying Griffin and Douglas to 
1 In Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), this Court held ~ ~ 
that it was not barred from considering a judgment resting on '-j' 
independent and adequate state procedural grounds if the rule in ~
question did not "serve a legitimate state interest." The  
Oklahoma rule certainly serves a "legitimate state interest." /A 
For obvious reasons, the state wo4ld prefer to have a trial j /L-'<..., 





this case suggests that petitioner was entitled to have a 
psychiatric examination of his sanity at the time he 
committed his crime. 
In Ross v. Moffitt,v:;17 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court 
limited the reach of the Griffin-Douglas rationale by holding 
that the state was not required to appoint counsel for 
discretionary appeals. Recognizing the impossibility of 
acheiving the absolute equality that the Griffin-Douglas 
principle, carried to its logical extreme, would require, the 
Court held that the state need only provide indigent 
defendants with "an adequate opportunity to present their 
claims fairly within the adversary system." There was, the 
Court reasoned, no basis for thinking that an indigent 
defendant who had been represented by an attorney on his 
first appeal could not adequately present his claims to the 
state supreme court. 
present" his 
In contrast, an_ indig_.ant crnot "~lya /' ~ 
insanity defense without having had 
psychiatric examination. 2 Indeed, it appears that virtually ' :~ 
all lower courts have held that a er iminal defendant is 
entitled to at least one psychiatric examination. See,e.g., 
2In Oklahoma, a lay witness may give his opinion of the 
defendant's sanity. High v. State, 401 P.2d 189 (Okla.Cr. 1965). 
The effectiveness of these lay witnesses is questionable, 
however. Even if a layman can recognize the signs of cognitive 
or emotional disturbance, professional training or experience 
often may be required to elicit more detailed information. A. 
Goldstein, The Insanity Defense 25-26 (1967). More importantly, 
the psychiatrist may be needed to provide a framework for 
otherwise unrelated pieces of information. 
Finney v. Zant, 709 F.2d 643 (11th Cir. 1983) 
The Oklahoma court 
States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi 
upon United 
(1953), in 
deciding that an indigent defendant need not be provided with 
a psychiatric examination. In Baldi, the defendant was 
convicted of first degree murder on a guilty plea. After the 
plea, but before final adjudication and sentencing, the court 
heard testimony on the defendant's sanity from a court-
appointed psychiatrist and two psychiatrists called by the 
defense. The defendant argued before the Supreme Court that 
the denial of his request for pre-trial psychiatric 
assistance had resulted in inadequate assistance of counsel. 
The Court held, however, that the state had no constitutional 
duty to provide psychiatric assistance. Id. at 568. The 
Court reasoned that it was sufficient that the issue of the 
defendant's sanity had been heard by the trial court and that 
psychiatrists had testified. Therefore, Baldi is inapposite 
in this case because none of the psychiatrists called by Ake 
were able to testify about his sanity when he committed the 
crimes. 
Because no psychiatrist evaluated Ake with respect 
to his sanity during the murders, the judgment of the 
Oklahoma court could be reversed without overruling Baldi. --~~~~~~~~~~------------ ---- _.,. 
Nevertheless, since Baldi is inconsistent with the Griffin-
Douglas principle, it should be explicitly overruled. If the 
court does not appoint a psychiatric expert to assist the 
defendant, "the type of trial that a man gets depends on the 
•.. .. 
a_.~~~ / L'-' 
amount of money he has." 
~~.__,__ 
This result is impermissible ~
notwithstanding more recent decisions recognizing 
Griffin-Douglas does not require absolute equality. A 
neutral, court-appointed psychiatrist is not under obligation 
to help the defendant prepare for trial, and is required to 
assist the government as much as the defendant. Thus, it is 
doubtful that one examination by a neutral psychiatrist will 
provide an indigent with "an adequate opportunity to present 
[his) claims fairly within the adversary system." See Ross -----
v. Moffett,. 
examination 
Therefore, providing the defendant with an 
by a neutral expert cannot satisfy the 
requirements of the Due Process Clause and the Equal 
Protection Clause. 3 
Oklahoma should not be required by the constitution 
to furnish a psychiatrist to every er iminal defendant. An 
accused indigent is entitled to such assistance only if it is 
"necessary" to his defense. In deciding whether a 
psychiatric examination is "necessary," the lower courts 
should look to cases interpreting the Criminal Justice Act of 
3An expert may be necessary to evaluate the facts and to help 
develop trial strategy. In many cases, such an evaluation is 
essential in making an intelligent decision about whether to 
pursue a certain line of defense, or even in deciding whether to 
go to trial. D. Danner, Expert Witness Checklists 72 (1983). 
Moreover, the expert can help the attorney prepare for trial by 
advising him about facts and theories that may be developed by 
the other side. 
Most of the lower courts have held that an examination ~t 
by neutral expert!§ sufficient. See,e.g., Finney v. Zant, 709 
F.2d 643 (11th Cir. 1983). Their decisions obviously are ...d. :.A~ 
constrained by Baldi. See id. at 645. ~,~ 
> I '~ 
1--,__ ~ 
~)v 
1964. 18 u.s.c. §3006A(e). Courts have held that a 
psychiatric expert is "reasonably necessary to an adequate 
defense" within the meaning of the CJA, if the defendant's 
sanity is "seriously an issue. 11 See Bush v. McColl um, 231 
F.Supp 560 (N.D.Tex. 1964), aff'd, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 
J.965) • Here, obviously Ake's sanity at the time of the 
killings was "seriously an issue." The petitioner was first 
diagnosed as schizophrenic in February 1980, about four 
months after the murders. Generally accepted diagnostic 
criteria for schizophrenia require a finding that the patient 
ha·s shown signs of the illness for at least six months. 
American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of mental Disorders (3d ed.) at 189. Therefore, the ~ 1' 
appointment of a psychiatric expert was "necessary" in this ~ 
case. 4 
____________________ __. .
it appears that the trial court's 
failure a psychiatrist violated Ake's 
constitutional rights. In providing Ake with an expert for 
his retrial, the state should have the same flexibility that 
4without expert testimony, it is very difficult to show that 
sanity is "seriously an issue." Therefore, some judges have 
suggested lowering the burden placed on defense counsel. In 
United States v. Theirault, 440 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 
1971) (Wisdom,J.,concurring), for example, Judge Wisdom stated 
that the trial court should rely on the judgment of the defense 
attorney if the latter makes a reasonable request. Although it 
is wise to keep in mind the difficulty of establishing 
"necessity," I do not think that the liberality which Judge 
Wisdom suggests is appropriate under the CJA should become a 
constitutional standard. 
it has in providing indigent defendants with counsel. Ake is 
not entitled to the psychiatrist of his choice, nor does .ae-l\ 
have a right to "shop around" for a favorable diagnosis. 
II. Psychiatric Expert for Defendant at the Sentencing Phase 
~etitioner contends that he was entitled to the 
assistance of a psychiatric expert in presenting mitigating 
circumstances to the jury. Because many potential mitigating 
circumstances relate to the defendant's state of mind, a 
psychiatrist probably could have aided the petitioner at the 
sentencing phase of the trial. Ake contends that permitting 
the indigent capital defendant to introduce mitigating 
evidence is meaningless if he lacks the funds necessary to 
compile the evidence. The argument is unpersuasive, however. 
In the only case he cites, the court rejected the claim 
advanced here. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 
1983). CAll noted that friends, relatives, neighbors, and 
the defendant himself "could have taken the stand in the 
penalty phase of trial and introduced mitigating testimony." 
Ake himself had a number of friends and relatives who could 
have been called to testify as to his state of mind. 
Although this lay testimony is not sufficient at trial when 
an insanity defense is raised, it enables the jury to decide 
whether mitigating circumstances warrant a penalty of life 
imprisonment only. 
Petitioner further contends that the state was 
obligated to provide him with the assistance of a 
psychiatrist, so that the prosecution's claim of "future 
._._---------------
dan erousness" could be rebutted. This claim stands on firm 
ground, for no lay person could refute effectively the 
testimony of the state's experts. If the state intends to 
argue "future dangerousness" at the sentencing phase, the 
Griffin-Douglas principle suggests that the indigent 
defendant is entitled to the assistance of a psychiatrist. 
Moreover, the Court's reasoning in Barefoot v. Estelle, 51 
-----u.s.L.w. 5189 (1983), indicates that the introduction of ?? 
expert testimony on "future d~nge~ousness," if it is not 1 
rebutted by defense psychiatrists, violates the capital 
defendant's eighth amendment rights. In Barefoot, the Court 
held that the state could present psychiatric testimony 
relating to future dangerousness only because fact-finders 
"would have the benefit of cross-examination and contrary 
evidence by the opposing party." The Barefoot Court was 
careful to note that Texas provided funds for indigents to 
' ,....._., ----
secure the assistance of psychiatric experts. ------------------ ___. 
In summary, Oklahoma was required by the 
constitution to appoint a psychiatrist to aid the defendant 
in rebutting the state's claim of future dangerousness. 5 
5ordinarily, the state would not be required to appoint a 
psychiatrist until the sentencing phase. In this case, however, 
the state brought out the evidence of "future dangerousness" at 
the guilt phase. Under these circumstances, the state must 
appoint a psychiatrist sooner, in order to facilitate the defense 
attorney's cross-examination of the government witness. 
III. Competency to Stand Trial 
The trial court's failure to order a competency 
hearing violated petitioner's fourteenth amendment rights. 
Thorazine, the antipsychotic drug administered to defendant, 
_____..--, 
sometimes causes severe drowsiness and apathy. Petitioner's 
behavior at trial suggested that these side effects were 
present and impaired his ability to understand the 
proceedings against him and to consult with his attorney. 
v--
The defense attorney described Ake as a "totally and 
completely incoherent zombie." Moreover, the trial judge 
noted that "there was all along a real question as to whether 
this man had any kind of mental capacity." Under these 
circumstances, Ake's constitutional rights were violated the 
trial court's failure to make an inquiry into his 
competency. 6 
SUMMARY 
The judgment of the lower court should be reversed. 
Under the Griffin-Douglas principle, a state court must 
appoint a psychiatrist to assist an indigent whose sanity is 
"seriously an issue." Moreover, if the state uses expert 
6Prior to trial, Ake's counsel withdrew a motion for a trial on 
the issue of competency. The withdrawal of this motion does not 
constitute a "waiver." · This Court has recognized that "it is 
comtradictory to argue tht a d~f-errdafft may be incompetent and yet 
knowingly or intellingently waive his right to have the court 
determine his capacity to stand trial." See Pate v. Robinson, 
383 u.s. 375, 384 (1966). ~--~-
testimony to show a defendant's II future dangerousness, 11 the 
indigent is entitled to the assistance of a psychiatric 
expert. Finally, the trial judge must order a competency 
hearing, even in the middle of a trial, if it appears that 
the defendant is unable to understand the proceedings against 
him or to assist his attorney. 
,. 
,' ... 
November 2, 1984 
AKE4 GINA-POW 
TO: Lee 
FROM: LFP, JR. 
RE: 83-5424 Ake v. Oklahoma 
Your bench memo is excellent, and I certainly agree 
generally with your views. 
I would like to know exactly what the federal rule is 
with respect to providing a psychiatrist. Petitioners 
brief states that this is done by the us and a majority of 
the states. Your memo concludes that there is a 
constitutional right to have a psychiatrist appointed 
either by the court or selected by defense counsel. 
If defense counsel does the choosing, he will do what 
lawyers always do in selecting "experts": Find one who 
will support their client. My own experience (not 
er iminal) is that where testimony is by an "expert", one 
; 
almost always can find what we call a "tame" one. 
It would be sensible - and I hope constitutional -
for us to hold that the court - upon request in a case 
like this one - must appoint a neutral psychiatrist chosen 
; 
in consul tat ion with counsel for the prosecution and the 
defense. 
The next question is whether such a psychiatrist has 
a duty to cooperate with defense counsel in planning 
strategy and otherwise? Clearly, defense counsel should 
be able to consult with the psychiatrist, and plan his 
direct examination. In this process, counsel would be 
educated as to what to ask state witnesses on cross-
examination. But I doubt that the "neutral" psychiatrist 
should sit beside defense counsel as a partisan at trail. 
I would like to know what the federal courts do, but 
definitely do not want another long memo. This case comes 
up near the end of next week, so we have plenty of time. 
; 
,. 
alb 11/05/84 3 3c,o~ 4 : 1-t...t-~-~~ -
~~~~~~~+-
~~--t,,i-..~<l/!ilk~~ 
TO: Justice Powell ~4....~ .~~~~
FROM: Lee ;, ,,r_-,ul..,.,, .,:,J;-~ 
RE: No. 83-54{4"";'°Ake v~ahoma, ' supplement to bench memo /S~ 
In the federal courts, psyc~iatrists are appointed for~ -
indigent defendants pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act (CJA), ~ 
~ Ll-
which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Counsel for a person who is financially unable to 
obtain investigative, expert, or other otb~c services 
necessary for an adequate defense may request them in 
an ex parte application. Upon finding, after 
appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the 
services are necessary and that the person is 
financially unable to obtain them, the court .•. shall 
authorize counsel to obtain the services. 
18 u.s.c. §3006A(e) (1). In interpreting this Act, most federal 
courts have held that the appointed psychiatrist should be a 
partisan witness, not an impartial one. ----- -, 
In United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 
1971), the court stated that a psychiatric expert appointed 
pursuant to 18 u.s.c. §4244 1 could not serve as a §3006A expert. 
The CAS stated that while the §4244 expert is expected to be 
"neutral and detached," the §3006 expert "serves a different 
role." The §3006A expert is a "partisan witness" whose 
"conclusions need not be reported in advance of trial to the 
1section 4244 concerns the examination to determine if the 
defendant"-Ts c9mpetent to stand trial. The court appoints a 
psychitatrist who examines the accused and reports to the court. 
Rule 28 authorizes the court to appoint its own expert witness, 
wficr 1s expected to be neutral and detached. He advises both 
parties of his findings. 18 u.s.c. §4244. 
; 
,,. 
court or to the proscution. 11 CA.4 reached the same conclusion in 
United States v. Reason, 549 F.2d 309 (1977), in which the court 
stated that §3006A expert affords the indigent accused a 
reasonable opportunity to procure the "services of a psychiatrist 
f""" 
to assist him in his defense." 549 F.2d at 311 (emphasis in 
original). See also United States v. Collins, 525 F.2d 213 (1st 
Cir. 1975). 
Although the federal courts have held that the indigent 
is entitled to a "partisan witness," they uniformly have rejected 
the idea that a defendant is entitled to a psychiatrist of his 
own choosing. See,e.g., United States v. Lincoln, 542 F.2d 746 -(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1106 (1976). The courts have 
stated, however, that it is "ordinarily desirable" to appoint the 
psychiatrist suggested by the defendant. See,e.g., United States 
v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1973). 
I think that this is what you wanted to know about the 
procedure for the appointment of psychiatric experts in federal 
court. 
me know. 
If it is not, or if you need more information, please let 
November 7, 1984 
AKE3 GINA-POW 
83-5424 Ake v. Okalahoma 
1. Where an indigent defendant relies on insanity at 
the time of the crime, the state is required to provide 
him with a psychiatric examination. The court should 
appoint the psychiatrist. Defense counsel should have no 
right to apppoint, but should be consulted. The 
psychiatrist should be available to defense counsel to 
assist in presenting the defendant's case. He is not to 
be a neutral witness. See Lee's memo. W 2. At the 
sentencing phase, where as here the state relied on 
testimony of its psychiatrist to establish defendant's 
"future dangerousness", the defendant also is entitled to 
have the assistance of a psychiatrist. 
3. If the question as to anti-psychotic medication 
of the defendant is here, the ef feet of such medication 
properly is the subject of testimony. Normally, anti-
psychotic medications tend to ~- restore competency. 
Apparently, there can be side effects that interfere with 
competency. I would not reach this question, as the case 
should be remanded on the first two issues. 
2. 
* 
Counsel for the state argues that Oklahoma law requires 
that an objection made at trial be renewed before the 
trial court on a motion for a new trial - thus giving that 
court an opportunity to correct any error. Since no 
motion for a new trial was made, it is argued that there 
was a procedural default, but the Oklahoma Court of 
Appeals addressed the question. 
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CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQU IST 
.i'u:prtmt <!f4turl qf t!f t ~th .ita.ug 
1lu!finghm. ~. <!f. 20ffe~, 
Re: 83-5424 - Ake v. Oklahoma 
Dear Thurgood: 
In due course I will circulate a dissent. 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMISERS OF" 
.JUSTICE Wt< . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
.tn:prmu OJirnrl d flrt ~b .tbtttl' 
Jru~ ~. <!f. 2llgi'l~ 
December 14, 1984 
No. 83-5424 





Copies to the Conference 
CHAMISE:RS 01' 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hprmtt <irourt of tlft ~~ .. tatt. 
'1ulfington. J. OJ. 2llc?)}# 
Re: No. 83-5424, Ake v. Oklahoma 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me. 
Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
December 17, 1984 
.,. 
i\tt.prtmt <ijonrl of tltt 'Jnittb .Stait.t' 
Jlas1finghm. ~. <q. 2llc?~~ 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE December 17, 1984 
Re: 83-5425 - Ake v. Oklahoma 
Dear Thurgood, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
' \ . 
lfp/ss 12/18/84 AKE SALLY-POW 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Lee DATE: Dec. 18, 1984 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
83-5424 Ake v. Oklahoma 
I have read Justice Marshall's opinion, and 
although it is considerably overwritten both in length and 
language, I agree that the holding is correct and well 
stated. 
I have two language changes that I suggest you 
bring to the attention of Justice Marshalls clerk. Fir~t, 
the last sentence on p. 9 reads as follows: 
"Further, where permitted by evidentiary rules, 
[psychiatrists) can translate a medical 
diagnosis into a legal conclusion •.•• " 
2. 
The word "legal" clearly should be omitted. No 
witness - expert or otherwise - can express an opinion in 
a trial as to a "legal" conclusion. Moreover, the word is 
unnecessary. It would be better simply to say that the 
psychiatrist can "translate his medical diagnosis into 
language that will assist the trier of fact. The 
pyschiatrist may express his conclusion as the sanity of 
the defendant and give his reasons. 
The second language change that is not quite as 
important, but it seems desirable. In the first sentence 
on p. 10, the opinion states that psychiatrists "ideal~y ; 
empower lay jurors " The use of the word "empower" 
is inappropriate. No witness can "empower" jurors to do 
anything. As it is correctly stated on p. 11, the 




j__u_- ~~ ~~ ~ 
i\u.prttttt <!}:ourl of tlrt 1utilt~ i\btit& 
~ulfbtghtn. J. <!}:. 2llp,.~ 
December 18, 1984 
CHAM1!5ERS OP' 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
Re: No. 83-5424 - Ake v. Oklahoma 
Dear Thurgood: 
I have carefully studied your opinion and while I am still inclined to 
go for the result, I have several problems. 
1. Section II.B. analyzes Ake's claim that he was deprived of expert 
testimony during the sentencing phase of the trial. This section 
is pretty much dicta and advisory. Since the opinion remands for 




The value of deferring ruling on this point is underscored by the 
fact that the state psychiatrists who testified as to Ake's future 
dangerousness were all called as defense witnesses. During the 
sentencing phase the prosecutor merely referred to cross-
examination testimony given by these defense witnesses during the 
guilt phase. Even if we were to reach this issue, it is not clear 
to me why prosecutorial reference to testimony given by defense 
witnesses requires the state to provide additional defense 
witnesses. 
On page 7, the defendant's interest in this case is stated to be 
only that of avoiding an "erroneous conviction." Is this a 
sufficient discussion of the defendant's interest? 
The fact that this is a capital case is barely mentioned. The ~ 
prospect of a capital sentence is critical to this case. I doubt -1-0 
that the Due Process Clause requires states to provide expert ~
witnesses generally to all cr'mina defendants. 9 ~f: 
~lYfA • ~ • ~ , ~LLl._~ 
I wonder i ( we do not need to treat more fully the the costs to 
the State. It is true, as you observe, that money is one cost 
and, of course, it is also true that the State shares the interest 
of defendants in securing an accurate verdict. But cost is not 
the only factor; a court need not give every defendant a free 
ert and must not be allowed to use this as a "gimmick" to delay 
rial. The administrative burden of providing experts is also a 
nificant factor. 
The opinion st~tes ~ holdin_g_ at two different places. The 
language--and, to some degree, the import--does not seem wholly 
consistent. On page 4, the opinion states, "We hold that when a 
defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the 
time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at trial, 
the Constitution requires that a State provide access to a 





otherwise afford one.• (emphasis added) On page 12, you state, 
•we therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial 
judge that his mental condition is to be a significant factor at 
trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defense access to ~,t.t.,-
a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate / 
examination and and assist in evaluation, preparation and 
presentation of the defense." (emphasis added) I have two 
problems: first, this suggests that a mere showing that the 
insanity defense will be raised suffices to require the provision 
of a psychiatrist, even without a showing that the claim has some 
basis in fact; second, it blurs the distinction between a 
defendant's "mental condition•--which could be read to be mean his 
mens rea or clinical mental illness--and legal insanity. 
----.;, -
I believe the holding should be something along the following 
line: "We hold that, when a defendant has made a preliminary 
showing that his mental capacity and sanity at the time of the 
offense is fairly in doubt and that his ability to comprehend the 
nature and consequences of actions will be a significant issue at 
trial, then the state must provide the defense access to a 
psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination.• 
You state on page 8 that "unlike a private litigant, a State may 
not legitimately assert an interest in maintenance of a strategic 
advantage over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to 
cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained." While I 
sympathize with the overall sentiment, I believe that this is 
unnecessary to the holding in suggesting that the State generally 
acts illegitimately in maintaining strategic advantages during the 
course of the adversary process. 
I question whether footnotes 10 and 13 are necessary. 
A minor point: you refer throughout the opinion to ; 
"psychiatrists." The American Psychological Association filed an 
amicus brief suggesting that if a privilege was found to exist, it 
should not be limited to psychiatrists, but should include other 
behavior professionals such as clinical psychologists. I have no 
strong feeling on this issue, but I wondered if we should not say 
"behavioral specialists" or something along that line. 
Sorry to be so long, but these points are important. 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE: SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Dear Thurgood, 
.fltJfrtnu <!fourl qf t4, ,ittittb .ttalt.G' 
Jla#}ringfon, ,. Of. 2llffe'!~ 
December 18, 1984 
No. 83-5424 Ake v. Oklahoma 
Like the Chief, I agree with the result reached in 
your excellent opinion and hope to join it, at least insofar 
as the guilt/innocence stage is concerned. With respect to 
the sentencing phase, I also think that we need not decide 
the issue and could simply remand. 
I also agree with the Chief's suggested 
formulation of the holding. I suppose a defendant's "mental 
condition" is technically a significant factor in any 
criminal case requiring proof of a specific intent. I had 
thought our opinion would be limited to either capital cases 
or cases where the defense of legal insanity was 
sufficiently raised to justify the furnishing of the expert 
services. 
I am quite concerned about the implications of 
FN 10 and would hope you would be willing to delete it as 
unnecessary to your holding. 
Finally, I thought the issue of whether there is 
an adequate and independent state ground was an essential 
jurisdictional point to be addressed preliminarily. I am 
troubled that we would not address it at all since it was 
argued. It can be answered by concluding under Oklahoma law 
there was no independent state ground. I hope you are 
content to deal with that point. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
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alb 12/18/84 
TO: Justice Powell 
FROM: Lee 
RE: No. 83-5424, Ake v. Oklahoma 
I talked to Justice Marshall's clerk about the two 
changes that you suggested in the language of the opinion. She 
agreed that both of your suggestions would improve the opinion. 
As you point out, an expert witness cannot express an opinion on 
a "legal" conclusion, nor can he "empower" the jurors to do 
anything. Therefore, the second draft of the Marshall opinion 
will incorporate these changes. 
You also asked me to comment briefly on the Chief's 
memo. I think that only one of his problems is substantial. I 
agree that the language on page 12 should be changed so as to 
make clear that the defendant must make a substantial showing 
that his sanity is in doubt, not merely his mental condition. I 
do not believe, however, that the Chief's other proposals are 
that helpful. I will comment briefly on his other suggestions: 
(1) I think that the Court should address the necessity of 
expert assistance in the sentencing 2hase where the state raises 
the issue of future dangerousness. The fact that the experts 
were called by the state does not seem relevant. The prosecution 
elicited the testimony on future dangerousness on cross-
examination, and it relied on this evidence at the sentencing 
phase. Moreover, the issue may arise again on remand if the 
defendant's insanity defense is again rejected by the jury. 
(2) I do not think that there is any reason to limit the 
right to a psychiatric expert to capital defendants. As we 
discussed, only defendants charged with serious crimes will raise 
the insanity defense. 
(3) I think that the costs are discussed adequately. The 
Chief may have written this portion differently, but the point 
does not seem that important. 
(5) Ditto. This language that the Chief finds objectionable 
does not seem very important. 
(6) Footnote 10 probably is unnecessary, but I do not think 
that its deletion is critical. This Court has used your opinion 
in Matthews v. Eldridge in various contexts. For example, in 
Little v. Streater, a unanimous Court relied on Matthews to hold 
that an indigent defendant in a paternity suit was entitled to a 
blood test. Footnote 10 simply makes the point that Matthews 
might be used in other contexts even if the defendant does not 
make a substantial showing that his sanity at the time of the 
crime is an issue. 
I think that footnote 13 is desirable, and it certainly "cut~ 
both ways." 
(7) I think that it might be better to define the right in 
terms of "psychiatrists." If this is not done, there is a chance 
that the indigent's expert will perceived by the jury as less-
educated than the prosecution's witnesses. 
Since we last talked, Justice O'Connor circulated a 
brief memo. The only new point she raises is that Justice 
Marshall did not address the independent and adequate state 
grounds argument. This is a good suggestion, but I do not think 
that discussion of this issue is essential unless it is raised in 
Justice Rehnquist's dissent. 
D~cember 19, 1984 
83-5424 ~ke v . Oklahoma 
Dear Thurgood: 
1n light of chanqes in your opinion suggested by 
other Justices, it may be helpful - in the event you make 
cha.noes - to ha,,e my views . 
In q~neral, I think your op1n1on is well written 
and persuasive. T certainly agree with the judgment and 
most of what you have said. 
~s th~ only case before us is a caoital one, we 
properly coulrl ljrnft our decision to such cases - though I 
would not insist on t~iR. ~s n practical mattPr, the Aue 
procPss reasoning of your opinion will apply equally in 
noncanital cas 0 s when th~ ~efen~ant ts charqerl with a ~eri-
ous crlme for which he may be imprisoneo for manv years . In 
the absence nf threat of long imprisonment, few defendants 
would wish to ole~~ insanity with its consequences of being 
committed to a mental institution and bearing the stigma of 
insanity. 
I agree that wherg a ~e,endant pleads insanity and 
'i\akes a sub~Jtant ial sho"linq of: n~erf, as in this case, there 
is a due proc~ss right to the assistance of a psychiatrist 
at the guilt stage ana also at the sentencing stage where 
the statP reli.es on future danq~rousness . This was my vote 
at Conferencf::'. 
'T'he Chief :.1.nd Sanora have a good point , and no 
~oubt you will agree, that the term "mental condition" could 
be misunderstood . The defendant must make a substantial 
showing that ~is sanity is in doubt . 
Finally , I share the concern expressed about foot-
note 1.0 . I agree that the Matthews v . Eldridge balancing 
analysis may be used in certain contexts . But this question 
is not before us , and the note could well invite defendants 
to raise issues th?.t will plague the courts . 
Subject to these suggestions, I will be happy to 
join your opinion . 
Justice Marshall 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
.t'uprmu ~(tut"i (tf tlft ~tt~ .t'tatts 
,riudfitttlhrn. ~. ~. 2llffe~, 
December 19, 1984 
Re: 83-5424 - Ake v. Oklahoma 
Dear Thurgood: 
V 
Please join me. I think there is a good deal of 
merit in the Chief's and Sandra's suggestions, but I 
am inclined to agree with you that we should retain 
Part IIB because the question is so likely to arise 
after the retrial and because this is a capital case. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Marshall 
Copies to the Conference 
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2nd DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-5424 
GLEN BURTON AKE, PETITIONER v. OKLAHOMA 
. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF 
CRIMINAL APPEALS OF OKLAHOMA 
[December - , 1984] 
JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The issue in this case is whether the Constitution requires 
that an indigent defendant have access to the psychiatric 
examination and assistance necessary to prepare an effective 
.defense based on his mental condition, when his sanity at the 
time of the offense is seriously in question. 
I 
Late in 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged 
with murdering a couple and wounding their two children. 
He was arraigned in the District Court for Canadian County, 
Okla., in February 1980. His behavior at arraignment, and 
in other prearraignment incidents at the jail, was so bizarre 
that the trial judge sua sponte ordered him to be examined 
by a psychiatrist "for the purpose of advising with the Court 
as to his impressions of whether the Defendant may need an 
extended period of mental observation." App. 2. The 
examining psychiatrist reported: "At times [Ake] appears to 
be frankly delusional . . . . He claims to be the 'sword of 
vengeance' of the Lord and that he will sit at the left hand of 
God in heaven." Id., at 8. He diagnosed Ake as a probable 
paranoid schizophrenic and recommended a prolonged psy-
chiatric evaluation to determine whether Ake was competent 
to stand trial. 
In March, Ake was committed to a state hospital to be ex-
amined with respect to his "present sanity," i. e., his compe-
; ; , 
2 
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tency to stand trial. On April 10, less than six months after 
the incidents for which Ake was indicted, the chief forensic 
psychiatrist at the state hospital informed the court that Ake 
was not competent to stand trial. The court then held a com-
petency hearing, at which a psychiatrist testified: 
"[Ake] is a psychotic ... his psychiatric diagnosis was 
that of paranoid schizophrenia-chronic, with exacerba-
tion, that is with current upset, and that in addition . . . 
he is dangerous. . . . [B]ecause of the severity of his 
mental illness and because of the intensities of his rage, 
his poor control, his delusions, he requires a maximum 
security facility within-I believe-the State Psychiatric 
Hospital system." Id., at 11-12. 
The court found Ake to be a "mentally ill person in need of 
care and treatment" and incompetent to stand trial, and or-
dered him committed to the state mental hospital. 
Six weeks later, the chief forensic psychiatrist informed 
the court that Ake had become competent to stand trial. At 
the time, Ake was receiving 200 milligrams of Thorazine, an 
antipsychotic drug, three times daily, and the psychiatrist in-
dicated that, if Ake continued to receive that dosage, his con-
dition would remain stable. The State then resumed pro-
ceedings against Ake. 
At a pretrial conference in June, Ake's attorney informed 
the court that his client would raise an insanity defense. To 
enable him to prepare and present such a defense adequately, 
the attorney stated, a psychiatrist would have to examine 
Ake with respect to his mental condition at the time of the 
offense. During Ake's 3-month stay at the state hospital, no 
inquiry had been made into his sanity at the time of the of-
fense, and, as an indigent, Ake could not afford to pay for a 
psychiatrist. Counsel asked the court either to arrange to 
have a psychiatrist perform the examination, or to provide 
funds to allow the defense to arrange one. The trial judge 
83-5424-0PINION 
AKE v. OKLAHOMA 3 
rejected counsel's argument that the Federal Constitution re-
quires that an indigent defendant receive the assistance of a 
psychiatrist when that assistance is necessary to the defense, 
and he denied the motion for a psychiatric evaluation at state 
expense on the basis of this Court's decision in United States 
ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U. S. 561 (1953). 
Ake was tried for two counts of murder in the first degree, 
a crime punishable by death in Oklahoma, and for two counts 
of shooting with intent to kill. At the guilt phase of trial, his 
sole defense was insanity. Although defense counsel called 
to the stand and questioned each of the psychiatrists who had 
examined Ake at the state hospital, none testified about his 
mental state at the time of the offense because none had ex-
amined him on that point. The prosecution, in turn, asked 
each of these psychiatrists whether he had performed or seen 
the results of any examination diagnosing Ake's mental state 
at the time of the offense, and each doctor replied that he had 
not. As a result, there was no expert testimony for either 
side on Ake's sanity at the time of the offense. The jurors 
were then instructed that Ake could be found not guilty by 
reason of insanity if he did not have the ability to distinguish 
right from wrong at the time of the alleged offense. They 
were further told that Ake was to be presumed sane at the 
time of the crime unless he presented evidence sufficient to 
raise a reasonable doubt about his sanity at that time. If he 
raised such a doubt in their minds, the jurors were informed, 
the burden of proof shifted to the State to prove sanity be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 1 The jury rejected Ake's insanity 
defense and returned a verdict of guilty on all counts. 
1 Oklahoma Stat., Tit. 21, § 152 (1981) provides that "[a]ll persons are ca-
pable of committing crimes, except those belonging to the following classes 
.. . (4) Lunatics, insane persons and all persons of unsound mind, including 
persons temporarily or partially deprived of reason, upon proof that at the 
time of committing the act charged against them they were incapable of 
knowing its wrongfulness." The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has 
held that there is an initial presumption of sanity in every case, "which re-
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At the sentencing proceeding, the State asked for the 
death penalty. No new evidence was presented. The pros-
ecutor relied significantly on the testimony of the state psy-
chiatrists who had examined Ake, and who had testified at 
the guilt phase that Ake was dangerous to society, to estab-
lish the likelihood of his future dangerous behavior. Ake 
had no expert witness to rebut this testimony or to introduce 
on his behalf evidence in mitigation of his punishment. The 
jury sentenced Ake to death on each of the two murder 
counts, and to 500 years' imprisonment on each of the two 
counts of shooting with intent to kill. 
On appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Ake 
argued that, as an indigent defendant, he should have been 
provided the services of a court-appointed psychiatrist. The 
court rejected this argument, observing: "We have held nu-
merous times that, the unique nature of capital cases not-
withstanding, the State does not have the responsibility of 
providing such services to· indigents charged with capital 
crimes." 663 P. 2d 1, 6 (1983). Finding no error in Ake's 
other claims, 2 the court affirmed the convictions and sen-
tences. We granted certiorari. 465 U. S. -- (1984). 
We hold that when a defendant has made a preliminary 
showing that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to 
be a significant factor at trial, the Constitution requires that 
as to his sanity at th~ time of the crime. If the issue is so raised, the bur-
den of proving the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt falls upon 
the State. " 663 P. 2d 1, 10 (1983); see also Rogers v. State , 634 P. 2d 743 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1981). 
2 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also dismissed Ake's claim 
that the Thorazine he was given during trial rendered him unable to under-
stand the proceedings against him or to assist counsel with his defense. 
The court acknowledged that Ake "stared vacantly ahead throughout the 
trial" but rejected Ake's challenge in reliance on a state psychiatrist's word 
that Ake was competent to stand trial while under the influence of the 
drug. 663 P. 2d, at 7-8. Ake petitioned for a writ of certiorari on this 
issue as well. In light of our disposition of the other issues presented, we 
need not address this claim. 
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a State provide access to a psychiatrist's assistance on this 
issue, if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one. Accord-
ingly, we reverse. 
II 
Initially, we must address our jurisdiction to review this 
case. After ruling on the merits of Ake's claim, the Okla-
homa court observed that in his motion for a new trial Ake 
had not repeated his request for a psychiatrist and that the 
claim was thereby waived. 663 P. 2d, at 6. The court cited 
Hawkins v. State, 569 P. 2d 490 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977), for 
this proposition. The State argued in its brief to this Court 
that the court's holding on this issue therefore rested on an 
adequate and independent state ground and ought not be re-
viewed. Despite the court's state law ruling, we conclude 
that the state court's judgment does not rest on an independ-
ent state ground and that our jurisdiction is therefore prop-
erly exercised. 
The Oklahoma waiver rule does not apply to fundamental 
trial error. See Hawkins v. State, supra, at 493; Gaddis v. 
State, 447 P. 2d 42, 45-46 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968). Under 
Oklahoma law, and as the State conceded at oral argument, 
federal constitutional errors are "fundamental." Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 51-52; see Buchanan v. State, 523 P. 2d 1134, 1137 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1974) (violation of constitutional right con-
stitutes fundamental error); see also Williams v. State, 658 
P. 2d 499 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). Thus, the State has 
made application of the procedural bar depend on an anteced-
ent ruling on federal law, that is, on the determination of 
whether federal constitutional error has been committed. 
Before applying the waiver doctrine to a constitutional ques-
tion, the state court must rule, either explicitly or implicitly, 
on the merits of the constitutional question. 
As we have indicated in the past, when resolution of the 
state procedural law question depends on a federal constitu-
tional ruling, the state law prong of the court's holding is not 
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eluded. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U. S. 117, 126 (1945) 
("We are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if 
the same judgment would be rendered by the state court 
after we corrected its views of Federal laws, our review 
could amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion"); 
Enterprise Irrigation District v. Farmers Mutual Canal 
Co., 243 U. S. 157, 164 (1917) ("But where the non-Federal 
ground is so interwoven with the other as not to be an inde-
pendent matter, or is not of sufficient breadth to sustain the 
judgment without any decision of the other, our jurisdiction 
is plain"). In such a case, the federal law holding is integral 
to the state court's disposition of the matter, and our ruling 
on the issue is in no respect advisory. In this case, the addi-
tional holding of the state court-that the constitutional chal-
lenge presented here was waived-depends on the court's 
federal law ruling and consequently does not present an inde-
pendent state ground for the decision rendered. We there-
fore turn to a consideration of the merits of Ake's claim. 
III 
This Court has long recognized that when a State brings its 
judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal 
proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant 
has a fair opportunity to present his defense. This elemen-
tary principle, grounded in significant part on the Fourteenth 
Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental fair-
ness, derives from the belief that justice cannot be equal 
where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is de-
nied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial 
proceeding in which his liberty is at stake. In recognition of 
this right, this Court held almost 30 years ago that once a 
State offers to criminal defendants the opportunity to appeal 
their cases, it must provide a trial transcript to an indigent 
defendant if the transcript is necessary to a decision on the 
merits of the appeal. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12 (1956). 
Since then, this Court has held that an indigent defendant 
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may not be required to pay a fee before filing a notice of ap-
peal of his conviction, Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 252 (1959), 
that an indigent defendant is entitled to the assistance of 
counsel at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963) 
and on his first direct appeal as of right, Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U. S. 353 (1963), and that such assistance must be 
effective. See Evitts v. Lucey, -- U. S. -- (1985); 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. -- (1984); McMann v. 
Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771, n. 14 (1970). 3 Indeed, in 
Little v. Streater, 452 U. S. 1 (1981), we extended this princi-
ple of meaningful participation to a "quasi-criminal" proceed-
ing and held that, in a paternity action, the State cannot deny 
the putative father blood grouping tests, if he cannot other-
wise afford them. 
Meaningful access to justice has been the consistent theme 
of these cases. We recognized long ago that mere access to 
the courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper func-
tioning of the adversary process, and tha;t a criminal trial is 
fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an indi-
gent defendant without making certain that he has access to 
the raw materials integral to the building of an effective de-
fense. Thus, while the Court has not held that a State must 
purchase for the indigent defendant all the assistance that his 
wealthier counterpart might buy, see Ross v. Moffitt, 417 
U. S. 600 (1974), it has often reaffirmed that fundamental 
fairness entitles indigent defendants to "an adequate oppor-
tunity to present their claims fairly within the adversary sys-
tem," id., at 612. To implement this principle, we have 
focused on identifying the "basic tools of an adequate defense 
or appeal," Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U. S. 226, 227 
(1971), and we have required that such tools be provided to 
those defendants who cannot afford to pay for them. · 
3 This Court has recently discussed the role that due process has played 
in such cases, and the separate but related inquiries that due process and 
equal protection must trigger. See Evitts v. Lucey, - U. S. -
(1985); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U. S. 660 (1983). 
8 
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To say that these basic tools must be provided is, of course, 
merely to begin our inquiry. In this case we must decide 
whether, and under what conditions, the participation of a 
psychiatrist is important enough to preparation of a defense 
to require the State to provide an indigent defendant with ac-
cess to competent psychiatric assistance in preparing the de-
fense. Three factors are relevant to this determination. 
The first is the private interest that will be affected by the 
action of the State. The second is the governmental interest 
that will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided. The 
third is the probable value of the additional or substitute pro-
cedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an errone-
ous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards 
are not provided. See Little v. Streater, supra, at 6; 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U. S. 319, 335 (1976). We turn, 
then, to apply this standard to the issue before us. 
A 
The private interest in the accuracy of a criminal proceed-
ing that places an individual's life or liberty at risk is almost 
uniquely compelling. Indeed, the host of safeguards fash-
ioned by this Court over the years to diminish the risk of 
erroneous conviction stands as a testament to that concern. 
The interest of the individual in the outcome of the State's 
effort to overcome the presumption of innocence is obvious 
and weighs heavily in our analysis. 
We consider, next, the interest of the State. Oklahoma 
asserts that to provide Ake with psychiatric assistance on the 
record before us would result in a staggering burden to the 
State. Brief for Respondent 46-47. We are unpersuaded 
by this assertion. Many States, as well as the Federal Gov-
ernment, currently make psychiatric assistance available to 
indigent defendants, and they have not found the financial 
burden so great as to preclude this assistance. 4 This is espe-
' See Ala. Code § 15-12-21 (Supp. 1984); Alaska Stat. Ann. § 18.85.100 
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cially so when the obligation of the State is limited to provi-
sion of one competent psychiatrist, as it is in many States, 
and as we limit the right we recognize today. At the same 
time, it is difficult to identify any interest of the State, other 
than that in its economy, that weighs against recognition of 
this right. The State's interest in prevailing at trial-unlike 
that of a private litigant-is necessarily tempered by its in-
terest in the fair and accurate adjudication of criminal cases. 
Thus, also unlike a private litigant, a State may not legiti-
mately assert an interest in maintenance of a strategic advan-
noncapital cases in State v. Peeler, 126 Ariz. 254, 614 P. 2d 335 (App. 
1980)); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 17-456 (Supp. 1983); Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 987.9 
(West Supp. 1984) (capital cases; right recognized in all cases in People v. 
Worihy, 109 Cal.App. 3d 514, 167 Cal. Rptr. 402 (1980)); Colo. Rev. Stat. 
§ 18-1-403 (Supp. 1984); State v. Clemons, 168 Conn. 395, 363 A. 2d 33 
(1975); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 29, § 4603 (1983); Fla. Rule Crim. Proc. 3.216; 
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 802-7 (Supp. 1983); State v. Olin, 103 Idaho 391, 648 P. 
2d 203 (1982); P~ople v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N. E. 2d 645 (1966); 
Owen v. State, 272 Ind. 122, 396 N. E. 2d 376 (1979) (trial judge may au-
thorize or appoint experts where necessary); Iowa Rule Crim. Proc. 19; 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4508 (Supp. 1983); Ky. Rev. Stat. §§ 31.070, 31.110, 
31.185 (1980); State v. Madison, 345 So. 2d 485 (La. 1977); State v. Anaya, 
456 A. 2d 1255 (Me. 1983); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 621, § 27C(4) (West 
Supp. 1984-1985); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 768.20a(3) (Supp. 1983); 
Minn. Stat. § 611.21 (1982); Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-17 (Supp. 1983); 
Mont. Code Ann. § 46-8-201 (1983); State v. Suggett, 200 Neb. 693, 264 
N. W. 2d 876 (1978) (discretion to appoint psychiatrist rests with trial 
court); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 7.135 (1983); N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 604-A:6 
(Supp. 1983); N. M. Stat. Ann. §§ 31-16-2, 31-16-8 (1984); N. Y. County 
Law § 722~ (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-454 
(1981); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2941.51 (Supp. 1983); Ore. Rev. Stat. 
§ 135.055(4) (1983); Commonwealth v. Gelormo, - Pa. Super. -, 
-, and n. 5, 475 A. 2d 765, 769, and n. 5 (1984); R. I. Gen. Laws 
§ 9-17-19 (Supp. 1984); S. C. Code§ 17-3-80 (Supp. 1983); S. D. Codified 
Laws § 23A-40-8 (Supp. 1984); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-14-207 (Supp. 1984); 
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. § 26.05 (Vernon Supp. 1984); Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-32-1 (1982); Wash. Rev. Code §§ 10. 77.020, 10. 77.060 (1983) (see 
also State v. Cunningham, 18 Wash. App. 517, 569 P. 2d 1211 (1977)); W. 
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tage over the defense, if the result of that advantage is to 
cast a pall on the accuracy of the verdict obtained. We 
therefore conclude that the governmental interest in denying 
Ake the assistance of a psychiatrist is not substantial, in light 
of the compelling interest of both the State and the individual 
in accurate dispositions. 
Last, we inquire into the probable value of the psychiatric 
assistance sought, and the risk of error in the proceeding if 
such assistance is not offered. We begin by considering the 
pivotal role that psychiatry has come to play in criminal pro-
ceedings. More than 40 States, as well as the Federal Gov-
ernment, have decided either through legislation or judicial 
decision that indigent defendants are entitled, under certain 
circumstances, to the assistance of a psychiatrist's exper-
tise. 5 For example, in subsection (e) of the Criminal Justice 
Act, 18 U. S. C. §3006A, Congress has provided that indi-
gent defendants shall receive the assistance of all experts 
"ne~essary for an adequate defense," Numerous state stat-
utes guarantee reimbursement for expert services under a 
like standard. And in many States that have not assured ac-
cess to psychiatrists through the legislative process, state 
courts have interpreted the State or Federal Constitution to 
require that psychiatric assistance be provided to indigent 
defendants when necessary for an adequate defense, or when 
insanity is at issue. 6 
These statutes and court decisions reflect a reality that we 
recognize today, namely, that when the State has made the 
defendant's mental condition relevant to his criminal culpabil-
ity and to the punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a 
psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to 
marshal his defense. In this role, psychiatrists gather facts, 
both through professional examination, interviews, and else-
where, that they will share with the judge or jury; they ana-
lyze the information gathered and from it draw plausible con-
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clusions about the defendant's mental condition, and about 
the effects of any disorder on behavior; and they offer opin-
ions about how the defendant's mental condition might have 
affected his behavior at the time in question. They know the 
probative questions to ask of the opposing party's psychia-
trists and how to interpret their answers. Unlike lay wit-
nesses, who can merely describe symptoms they believe 
might be relevant to the defendant's mental state, psychia-
trists can identify the "elusive and of ten deceptive" symp-
toms of insanity, Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U. S. 9, 12 (1950), 
and tell the jury why their observations are relevant. Fur-
ther, where permitted by evidentiary rules, psychiatrists can 
translate a medical diagnosis into . language that will assist 
the trier of fact, and therefore offer evidence in a form that 
has meaning for the task at hand. Through this process of 
investigation, interpretation and testimony, psychiatrists 
ideally assist lay jurors, who generally have no training in 
psychiatric matters, to make a sensible and educated deter-
mination about the mental condition of the defendant at the 
time of the offense. 
Psychiatry is not, however, an exact science, and psychia-
trists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes 
mental illness, on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to 
given behavior and symptoms, on cure and treatment, and on 
likelihood of future dangerousness. Perhaps because there 
often is no single, accurate psychiatric conclusion on legal in-
sanity in a given case, juries remain the primary factfinders 
on this issue, and they must resolve differences in opinion 
within the psychiatric profession on the basis of the evidence 
offered by each party. When jurors make this determina-
tion about issues that inevit!lbly are complex and foreign) the 
testimony of psychiatrists can be crucial and "a virtual neces-
sity if an insanity plea is to have any chance of success." 7 
1 Gardner, The Myth of the Impartial Psychiatric Expert-Some Com-
ments Concerning Criminal Responsibility and the Decline of the Age of 
Therapy, 2 Law & Psychology Rev. 99, 113-114 (1976). In addition, 
12 
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By organizing a defendant's mental history, examination re-
sults and behavior, and other information, interpreting it in 
light of their expertise, and then laying out their investiga-
tive and analytic process to the jury, the psychiatrists for 
each party enable the jury to make its most accurate deter-
mination of the truth on the issue before them. It is for this 
reason that States rely on psychiatrists as examiners, consul-
tants, and witnesses, and that private individuals do as well, 
when they can afford to do so. 8 In so saying, we neither ap-
prove nor disapprove the widespread reliance on psychia-
trists but instead recognize the unfairness of a contrary hold-
ing in light of the evolving practice. 
The foregoing leads inexorably to the conclusion that, with-
out the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a professional 
examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help deter-
mine whether the insanity defense is viable, to present testi-
mony, and to assist in preparing the cross-examination of a 
"[t]estimony emanating from the depth and scope of specialized knowledge 
is very impressive to a jury. The same testimony from another source can 
have less effect." F . Bailey & H. Rothblatt, Investigation and Prepara-
tion of Criminal Cases § 175 (1970); see also ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice 5-1.4, Commentary, p. 5-20 (2d ed. 1982) ("The quality ofrepresen-
tation at trial . . . may be excellent and yet valueless to the defendant if the 
defense requires the assistance of a psychiatrist ... and no such services 
are available"). 
8 See also Reilly v. Barry, 250 N. Y. 456, 461, 166 N. E. 165, 167 (1929) 
(Cardozo, C. J.) ("[U]pon the trial of certain issues, such as insanity or 
forgery , experts are often necessary both for prosecution and for de-
fense. . . . [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, ifhe is unable 
because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts of those 
against him"; 2 I. Goldstein & F. Lane, Goldstein Trial Techniques § 14.01 
(2d ed. 1969) ("Modern civilizmion, with its complexities of business, sci-
ence, and the professions, has made expert and opinion evidence a neces-
sity. This is true where the subject matters involved are beyond the gen-
eral knowledge of the average juror"); Henning, The Psychiatrist in the 
Legal Process, in By Reason of Insanity: Essays on Psychiatry and the 
Law 217, 219-220 (L. Freedman ed., 1983) (discussing the growing role of 
psychiatric witnesses as a result of changing definitions of legal insanity 
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State's psychiatric witnesses, the risk of an inaccurate resolu-
tion of sanity issues is extremely high. With such assist-
ance, the defendant is fairly able to present at least enough 
information to the jury, in a meaningful manner, as to permit 
it to make a sensible determination. 
A defendant's mental condition is not necessarily at issue in 
every criminal proceeding, however, and it is unlikely that 
psychiatric assistance of the kind we have described would be 
of probable value in cases where it is not. The risk of error 
from denial of such assistance, as well as its probable value, 
are most predictably at their height when the defendant's 
mental condition is seriously in question. When the defend-
ant is a_ble to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial 
court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his 
defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is 
readily apparent. It is in such cases that a defense may be 
devastated by the absence of a psychiatric examination and 
testimony; with such assistance, the defendant might have a 
reasonable chance of success. In such a circumstance, where 
the potential accuracy of the jury's determination is so dra-
matically enhanced, and where the interests of the individual 
and the State in an accurate proceeding are substantial, the 
State's interest in its fisc must yield. 9 
We therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates to 
the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to 
be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, 
assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who 
will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evalua-
tion, preparation, and presentation of the defense. This is 
not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a con-
stitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking 
·or to receive funds to hire his own. Our concern is that the 
9 In any event, before this Court the State concedes that such a right 
exists but argues only that it is not implicated here. Brief for Respondent 
45; Tr. of Oral Arg. 52. It therefore recognizes that the financial burden is 
not always so great as to outweigh the individual interest. 
14 
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indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist 
for the purpose we have discussed, and as in the case of the 
provision of counsel we leave to the States the decision on 
how to implement this right. 
B 
Ake also was denied the means of presenting evidence to 
rebut the State's evidence of his future dangerousness. The 
foregoing discussion compels a similar conclusion in the con-
text of a capital sentencing proceeding, when the State 
presents psychiatric evidence of the defendant's future dan-
gerousness. We have repeatedly recognized the defendant's 
compelling interest in fair adjudication at the sentencing 
phase of a capital case. The State, too, has a profound inter-
est in assuring that its ultimate sanction is not erroneously 
imposed, and we do not see why monetary considerations 
should be more persuasive in this context than at trial. The 
variable on which we must focus is, therefore, the probable 
value that the assistance of a psychiatrist will have in this 
area, and the risk attendant on its absence. 
This Court has upheld the practice in many States of plac-
ing before the jury psychiatric testimony on the question of 
future dangerousness, see Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U. S. 800, 
896-905 (1983), at least where the defendant has had access 
to an expert of his own, id., at 899, n. 5. In so holding, the 
Court relied, in part, on the assumption that the factfinder 
would have before it both the views of the prosecutor's psy-
chiatrists and the "opposing views of the defendant's doctors" 
and would therefore be competent to "uncover, recognize, 
and take due account of . . . shortcomings" in predictions on 
this point. Id., at 899. Without a psychiatrist's assistance, 
the defendant cannot offer a well-informed expert's opposing 
view, and thereby loses a significant opportunity to raise in 
the jurors' minds questions about the State's proof of an ag-
gravating factor. In such a circumstance, where the conse-
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chiatric testimony so evident, and the burden on the State so 
slim, due process requires access to a psychiatric examination 
on relevant issues, to the testimony of the psychiatrist, and 
to assistance in preparation at the sentencing phase. 
C 
The trial court in this case believed that our decision in 
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U. S. 561 (1953), 
absolved it completely of the obligation to provide access to a 
psychiatrist. For two reasons, we disagree. First, neither 
Smith, nor McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F. 2d 151, 155 (CAl 
1951), to which the majority cited in Smith, even suggested 
that the Constitution does not require any psychiatric exami-
nation or assistance whatsoever. Quite to the contrary, the 
record in Smith demonstrated that neutral psychiatrists in 
fact had examined the defendant as to his sanity and had tes-
tified on that subject at trial, and it was on that basis that the 
Court found no additional assistance was necessary. Smith, 
supra, at 568; see also United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 
192 F. 2d 540, 547 (CA3 1951). Similarly, in McGarty, the 
defendant had been examined by two psychiatrists who were 
not beholden to the prosecution. We therefore reject the 
State's contention that Smith supports the broad proposition 
that "[t]here is presently no constitutional right to have a 
psychiatric examination of a defendant's sanity at the time of 
the offense." Brief in Opposition 8. At most it supports the 
proposition that there is no constitutional right to more psy-
chiatric assistance than the defendant in Smith had received. 
In any event, our disagreement with the State's reliance on 
Smith is more fundamental. That case was decided at a time 
when indigent defendants in state courts had no constitu-
tional right to even the presence of counsel. Our recognition 
since then of elemental constitutional rights, each of which 
has enhanced the ability of an indigent defendant to attain a 
fair hearing, has signaled our increased commitment to assur-
ing meaningful access to the judicial process. Also, neither 
16 
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trial practice nor legislative treatment of the role of insanity 
in the criminal process sits paralyzed simply because this 
Court has once addressed them, and we would surely be re-
miss to ignore the extraordinarily enhanced role of psychia-
try in criminal law today. 10 Shifts in all these areas since the 
time of Smith convince us that the opinion in that case was 
addressed to altogether different variables, and that we are 
not limited by it in considering whether fundamental fairness 
today requires a different result. 
IV 
We turn now to apply these standards to the facts of this 
case. On the record before us, it is clear that Ake's mental 
state at- the time of the offense was a substantial factor in his 
defense, and that the trial court was on notice of that fact 
when the request for a court-appointed psychiatrist was 
made. For one, Ake's sole defense was that of insanity. 
Second, Ake's behavior at arraignment, just four months 
after the offense, was so bizarre as to prompt the trial judge, 
sua sponte, to have him examined for competency. Third, a 
state psychiatrist shortly thereafter found Ake to be incom-
petent to stand trial) and suggested that he be committed. 
Fourth, when he was found to be competent six weeks later, 
it was only on the condition that he be sedated with large 
doses of Thorazine three times a day, during trial. Fifth, 
the psychiatrists who examined Ake for competency de-
scribed to the trial court the severity of Ake's mental illness 
less than six months after the offense in question, and sug-
gested that this mental illness might have begun many years 
earlier. App. 35. Finally, Oklahoma recognizes a defense 
of insanity, under which the initial burden of producing evi-
10 See Henning, su'[YT'a n. 8; Gardner, SU'[YT'a n. 7, at 99; H. Huckabee, 
Lawyers, Psychiatrists and Criminal law: Cooperation or Chaos? 179-181 
(1980) (discussing reasons for the shift toward reliance on psychiatrists); 
Huckabee, Resolving the Problem of Dominance of Psychiatrists in Crimi-
nal Responsibility Decisions: A Proposal, 27 Sw. L. J. 790 (1973). 
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dence falls on the defendant. 11 Taken together, these factors 
make clear that the question of Ake's sanity was likely to be a 
significant factor in his defense. 12 
In addition, Ake's future dangerousness was a significant 
factor at the sentencing phase. The state psychiatrist who 
treated Ake at the state mental hospital testified at the guilt 
phase that, because of his mental illness, Ake posed a threat 
of continuing criminal violence. This testimony raised the 
issue of Ake's future dangerousness, which is an aggravating 
factor under Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme, Okla. 
Stat. Tit. 21, § 701.12(7) (1981), and on which the prosecutor 
relied at sentencing. We therefore conclude that Ake also 
was entitled to the assistance of a psychiatrist on this issue 
and that the denial of that assistance deprived him of due 
process. 13 
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. 
It is so ordered. 
11 See n. 1, su-pra. . 
12 We express no opinion as to whether any of these factors, alone or in / 
combination, is necessary to make this finding. 
18 Because we conclude that the Due Process Clause guaranteed to Ake 
the assistance he requested and was denied, we have no occasion to con-
sider the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause, or the Sixth Amend-
ment, in this context. 
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opportunity whatsoever' to obtain psychiatric evidence for the 
preparation and presentation of a claim of insanity by way of 
defense when the defendant's legal sanity at the time of the 
offense was 'seriously in issue'." 
"The facts of the case and the question presented confine 
the actual holding of the Court. In capital cases the finality 
of the sentence imposed warrants protections that may or may not 
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